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INTRODUCTION

How much is beauty worth in dollars? Some people may recoil at
the very phrasing of this question.2 Yet placing a monetary value on
natural resources is not inherently destructive. Custom places a monetary value on artwork. Capitalism even values beautiful natural vistas
in the form of land prices. Placing a monetary value on beauty and
other features of nature may be essential if one is to protect natural
resources fully.
This Article explores the proper monetary valuation under
Superfund and other legislation of natural objects,' including living animals, aesthetic views, and water purity. The path to achieving valuation
is rife with pitfalls, both philosophical and practical. Should the law
focus on the monetary value to those people who "consume beauty for
gain," as in the free market, or should government also consider
beauty's existence and intrinsic value to the rest of society, which may
"consume it to live." If the latter, then what dollar value possibly can
be used?
Placing an economic value on natural resources is not just an academic exercise. Valuation of resources allows courts to assess damages
for environmental harm, deters future pollution, and helps ensure protection for natural ecosystems. When natural resources are publicly
held for (almost) free use, citizens have an inexorable incentive to over2.

See Higgs, Changing Value Perspectivesin Natural Resource Allocation: From Market to
TRANSACTIONS AM. FISHERIES Soc'y 525, 527 (1987). To Higgs, an environmental
ethicist, "to quantify values is to take away their essential power as edifying expressions of social
preference." Higgs asks, "[h]ow could we measure the experiential value of Niagara Falls?" as an
example of "certain types of social questions which cannot be fully considered by appeal to economic mechanisms." Id.; see also Kelnan, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, in REGULATION, Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 33-38. Kelman writes:
Finally, one may oppose the effort to place prices on a non-market thing and hence in effect
incorporate it into the market system out of a fear that the very act of doing so will reduce
the thing's perceived value. To place a price on the benefit may, in other words, reduce the
value of that benefit. Cost-benefit analysis thus may be like the thermometer that, when
placed in a liquid to be measured, itself changes the liquid's temperature.

Ecosystem, 116

3. See infra notes 10-51 and accompanying text.
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consume these resources. A person who pollutes natural resources may
seize the economic benefit of the polluting activity, while avoiding any
economic cost to himself from the harms caused by pollution. Economists call this practice externalizing a cost. As a result, public natural
resources are destroyed, even when contrary to the interest of society.4
One solution to this destructive situation forces those who harm the
environment to bear the economic costs of this harm. Commonly described in economics as internalizing an external cost, this objective was
one of the purposes of the Superfund legislation. According to the Senate Report, the first purpose of Superfund was to assure "that those
responsible for any damage, environmental harm, or injury from chemical poisons bear the costs of their actions." 5 Natural resource valuation
also may be critical to analyzing the costs and benefits of protecting the
environment in government regulation.'
Thus economics can form the foundation of environmental protection. While some environmentalists regard environmental resource
4. See generally A. FREEMAN, R HAVEMAN & A. KNEESE, THE ECONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY (1973); Ruff, The Economic Common Sense of Pollution, in MICROECONOMICS: SELECTED
READINGS 498 (E. Mansfield ed. 1975); see infra notes 377-81 and accompanying text.
5. S.REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1980). Upon signing the bill into law, President
Carter declared that "[miost important, it enables the Government to recover from responsible
parties the costs of their actions in the disposal of toxic wastes." Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980: Remarks on Signing H.R. 7020 Into Law, 16
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 2797, 2798 (Dec. 11, 1980). Court interpretations of Superfund concur,
finding that "Congress intended that those responsible for problems caused by the disposal of
chemical poisons bear the costs and responsibility for remedying the harmful conditions they created." United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982); see
also Ohio ex. rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1312 (N.D. Ohio 1983). To fulfill this
intent, the harms created by hazardous wastes must be monetized as damages to be imposed upon
those who create the harms.
6. While cost-benefit analysis has numerous critics, the system is increasingly employed in
analyzing proposed environmental protection regulations. See, e.g., Andrews, Economics and Environmental Decisions, Past and Present, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY UNDER REAGAN'S EXECUTIVE
ORDER. THE ROLE OF BENEFIT-CosT ANALYSIS 43 (K. Smith ed. 1984). See generally COMPTROLLER
GENERAL, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COsT-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BE

USEFUL IN ASSESSING ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS, DESPITE LIMITATIONS (1984). The application

of cost-benefit analysis has been limited, however, by shortcomings in the valuation of environmental benefits. See OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING & EVALUATION, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

AGENCY, EPA's USE OF BENEFIT-CosT ANALYSIS: 1981-1986, at 4-4 (Aug. 1987) (stating that in a
majority of EPA cost-benefit analyses, the agency was unable to monetize the benefits of the regulation in question). As long as cost-benefit analyses fail to monetize fully environmental benefits,
relatively intangible benefits may be overlooked or understated in the cost-benefit balancing. Costbenefit analysis tends to ignore variables that are not monetized. Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins of
Straining the Constitution through a Pseudo-Scientific Sieve, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 155, 161 (1984);
see also J. CAMPEN, BENEFIT, COST, AND BEYOND 63-64 (1986). The answer to this skewing in costbenefit analysis is not to abolish the analysis, but to incorporate better environmental and other
relatively intangible benefits. Id. at 99-102. Complete and accurate valuation of natural resources
would contribute to the improvement of cost-benefit analysis and the better protection of environmental concerns.
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monetization as a Faustian bargain,7 use of these economic principles
can provide an essential weapon for future protection of the environment.8 Internalizing external environmental costs through the market
can deter future ecological destruction, as well as remedy some acts of
past destruction.9 Therefore, accurately determining the value of natural resources is important for preserving nature. To preserve the environment effectively, valuation must be as complete and accurate as
possible.
The federal government and some states have taken the first halting steps toward determining how to value natural resources. This Article examines the nascent law of natural resource valuation and proposes
an approach more expansive than the approach under Superfund regulations. Part II summarizes the sources of legal authority that allow the
government to recover damages for harm done to natural resources
from environmental pollution. Part III summarizes the characteristics
of natural resources that could be compensable. Part IV discusses the
available methods for valuing the loss of natural resources. Finally, Part
7. See D. EHRENFELD, THE ARROGANCE OF HUMANISM 189 (1978). To Ehrenfeld, the effort of
placing economic value on nature is at best a subterfuge or "rationalization." Id. As such, the effort
is inevitably transparent and self-defeating. Ehrenfeld argues that this approach will fail to save
endangered species and other components of the ecology and may distract from genuine, effective
approaches. Id. at 189-92. The very act of referring to nature as a resource may undermine its
intrinsic value. Id. at 192. The modem "deep ecology" movement also rejects monetization of nature in virtually any form. See infra notes 122-24 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, even
Ehrenfeld concedes that economic and other "selfish" approaches to conservation can play an important role in protecting nature, in tandem with other approaches. D. EHRENFELD, supra, at 210.
8. See, e.g., Plater, In the Wake of the Snail Darter:An EnvironmentalLaw Paradigmand
Its Consequences, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 805 (1986). In his extensive review of the Tellico Dam
controversy under the Endangered Species Act, Plater contends that "as so often occurs in environmental cases, to have a realistic chance of prevailing in the long run, [environmentalists] had to
base their position on a comprehensive implicit benefit-cost-alternatives accounting." Id. at 814-15.
Plater further concludes that "[s]ound economic analysis, including analysis of constructive alternatives, is part of any environmental controversy's optimum strategy." Id. at 815. Indeed, the ultimate construction of the Tellico Dam may have resulted from the public perception of the snail
darter controversy as pitting the environment against economic growth. Id. at 849-50. When the
issue is framed in this fashion, environmentalists risk the "stigma of elitism," which may undermine their potential successes. Id. at 850. If environmentalists can show the compatibility of ecology and economic welfare, then their prospects for prevailing may be enhanced.
9. The ecological philosophy known as deep ecology, propounded by Aldo Leopold and
others, see infra notes 122-24 and accompanying text, rejects reliance on market mechanisms as
technocratic and ultimately doomed to failure, in favor of a public value paradigm that elevates
the environment above other concerns. Whatever the merits of such an attitude change, it does not
appear on the immediate horizon. One contemporary author, who believes in the need for a
noneconomic rationale for environmental protection, fears that "to depend on something like Aldo
Leopold's Land Ethic is almost certainly to succumb to the economic appetites of human nature."
Carpenter, Ecology in Court, and Other Disappointmentsof EnvironmentalScience and Environmental Law, 15 NAT. RESOURCEs LAW. 573, 585 (1983). Aldo Leopold himself worried that "our
educational and economic system is headed away from, rather than toward, an intense consciousness of land." A. LEOPOLD, THE LAND ETHIC 239 (1948).
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V argues that current regulations under Superfund are inadequate, and
proposes legal standards for monetizing the value of damages to natural
resources. Specifically, restoration cost should provide the presumptive
measure of damages, unless restoration is impossible or disproportionately expensive. When restoration is impractical, alternative contingent
valuation methods are appropriate. This approach recognizes the uncertainties confounding our efforts to value natural resources and best
achieves the objective of preserving natural resources at reasonable
cost.
II.

LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR GOVERNMENT RECOVERY OF NATURAL
RESOURCE DAMAGES

Before assessing the tools for natural resource damage valuation, it
is critical to review the legal framework that authorizes recovery for
these damages. While the most prominent federal authority is
Superfund, other statutes permit recovery in defined circumstances.
Furthermore, state statutes or state common law may enable a state
government to recover for some types of harm done to natural resources
within the state. This section surveys these sources of legal authority
and their limits.
A.

Superfund

Although Superfund ° is best known for authorizing the government to cleanup hazardous waste disposal sites," the legislation also
permits governmental entities to recover money damages when a release
of hazardous substances causes an "injury to, destruction of, or loss of
natural resources.' 2 Superfund defines the term "natural resources"
broadly to include "land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water,
drinking water supplies, and other such resources belonging to, managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by
the United States . . ., any State or local government, or any foreign
government."' 3 In short, the statute permits recovery for virtually any
10. The official name of Superfund is the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)), amended by The Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
11. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604-9607 (1982). For a general summary of these provisions, see Frank
& Atkeson, Superfund: Litigation and Cleanup, Env't Rep. (BNA), Special Report (1985); Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARv. L. Rv. 1458 (1986) [hereinafter Developments in the Law]; and Note, Superfund: Conscripting Industry Support for Environmental
Cleanup, 9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 524 (1981).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (Supp. IV 1986).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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damages on government lands.' 4 The Act, however, does not create a
private right of action for the recovery of natural resource damages.15
Only state or federal officials designated "to act on behalf of the
public as trustees for natural resources" may bring a Superfund action
to recover for natural resource damages."6 Under the statutory plan,
these officials first assess the natural resource damages resulting from a
release of a hazardous substance 7 and, if warranted, may bring an action against statutorily designated responsible parties.' s The statutory
defenses to these actions are quite limited. 9 If the court finds the de14. Commentators dispute the extent of the government's right to recover for natural resource damage. Some commentators suggest that "CERCLA be construed broadly to reach all resources within the government's jurisdiction," including at least some privately owned resources.
See Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1567. Other commentators, however, construe the
statutory language to restrict recoverable damages to those natural resources on state-owned lands.
See, e.g., Comments of the Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n. on the Dept. of Interior's Proposed Natural Resources Damage Assessment Regulations, at 33 (Mar. 19, 1986) (source on file with Author) [hereinafter Comments of the Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n] (stating that "not only does CERCLA preclude
recovery for private uses of resources, but it does not permit recovery for any effects to a resource
that lacks the appropriate government connection" (emphasis in original)), responding to Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 50 Fed. Reg. 52,126 (1985).
Resolution of this issue "will probably have to await judicial interpretation, further legislative
elaboration, or at least regulatory definition." Breen, CERCLA's Natural Resource Damage Provisions: What Do We Know So Far?, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,304, 10,306 (Aug. 1984).
The plain language of the statute makes clear Congress's intent to exclude some resources, though,
which rules out the broadest interpretations of coverage. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442
U.S. 330, 338 (1979) (stating that the court should give effect to "restrictive significance" of statutory language). Furthermore, because private resource owners almost certainly have a state common-law right of action to recover for these damages, the need for governmental recovery does not
seem great and raises the undesirable specter of double recovery. Even if statutory coverage is
limited strictly to government lands, its sway will be considerable because the federal government
owns roughly one-third of the Nation's land area. See Coggins, The Public Interest in Public Land
Law: A Commentary on the Policies of Secretary Watt, 4 PuB. LAND L. REv. 1 (1983).
15. In most instances, state tort law provides a remedy for damages to privately held natural
resources, such as shade trees, under the doctrines of trespass, negligence, nuisance, or strict liability for ultrahazardous substances.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(A) & (B) (Supp. IV 1986). The President has designated certain
federal agencies as trustees pursuant to the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Contingency
Plan. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.72 (1987). Numerous states also have designated their trustees for the
purposes of Superfund recovery.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (Supp. IV 1986). Damages also may be recovered for harms resulting from a "threatened release" of a hazardous substance, id., though it is unclear how the mere
threat would injure natural resources.
18. Liability for natural resource damages parallels that for cleanup costs, and includes current site owners, certain past owners, waste transporters, and generators of waste. See id. §
9607(a)(1)-(4).
19. In practice, the most significant defense may be Superfund's inapplicability to oil spills.
The statutory definition of hazardous substance explicitly excludes petroleum. Id. § 9601(14). The
value of this defense is mitigated, however, because natural resource damages resulting from oil
spills often may be recovered under the authority of the Clean Water Act. See infra notes 24-31.
The natural resource damage provisions of Superfund provide specifically that there will be no
liability when:
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fendants liable for the release, then it must assess damages commensurate to the degree of injury to natural resources. When the state or
federal government recovers the damages, it must use the money recovered "to restore, replace, or acquire the equivalent of such natural resources."20 Superfund's text, however, offers little guidance about how
these damages are to be measured.
To simplify the courts' task in valuing natural resource damages,
section 301 of Superfund authorizes the President to promulgate valuation regulations, a task since delegated to the Department of the Interior.2 1 These regulations create a "Type A" methodology for "simplified

assessments requiring minimal field observation," and a more elaborate
"Type B" methodology "for conducting assessments in individual cases
to determine the type and extent of short- and long-term injury, destruction or loss. ' ' 22 These regulations are particularly significant be-

cause any determination made under the regulations has "the force and
effect of a rebuttable presumption on behalf of the trustee."23
Thus Superfund provides a well-defined process for recovering natural resource damages. Theoretically, a state or the federal government
can easily identify a release of pollutants, ascertain the extent of damages according to the Department of the Interior regulations, and recover those damages from responsible parties. As demonstrated in Part
V section of this Article, however, the current framework cannot yet
fulfill the objectives of the Superfund legislation and is subject to considerable criticism.
[Tihe party sought to be charged has demonstrated that the damages to natural resources
complained of were specifically identified as an irreversible and irretrievable commitment of
natural resources in an environmental impact statement, or other comparable environment
analysis, and the decision to grant a permit or license authorizes such commitment of natural
resources, and the facility or project was otherwise operating within the terms of its permit or
license ....
42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (Supp. IV 1986). Still other general statutory defenses preclude recovery for
damages resulting from: "federally permitted release[s]," id. § 9607(j), damages from the application of registered pesticide products, id. § 9607(i), and damages from releases caused by acts of
God, war, and third parties unrelated to the defendant, id. § 9607(b). These defenses, however, are
unlikely to apply to most instances of natural resource damages. Damages are also unavailable
"where such damages and the release of a hazardous substance from which such damages resulted
have occurred wholly before [the enactment of this Act]." Id. § 9607(f). In addition, Superfund
places a cap on damages for certain releases from vessels and other forms of transportation. Id. §
9607(c).
20. Id. § 9607(f)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
21. See id,§ 9651(c)(1).
22. Id. § 9651(c)(2).
23. Id. § 9607(f)(2)(C). See generally Menefee, Recovery for Natural Resource Damages
Under Superfund: The Role of the Rebuttable Presumption, 12 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
15,057 (1982).
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The Clean Water Act and Other Federal Laws

Prior to Superfund, the Clean Water Act provided for recovery of
some natural resource damages.2 4 Like Superfund, this legislation authorizes designated state and federal representatives to "act on behalf
of the public as trustee of the natural resources." 25 Unlike Superfund,
the original text of the Clean Water Act defines specifically the measure
of damages as the cost of restoring or replacing the damaged or destroyed natural resources. 26
Section 311 of the Clean Water Act assigns liability for the discharge of oil or hazardous substances into United States navigable waters or near the coastal shoreline. Parties liable under section 311
include the owners and operators of vessels or onshore and offshore facilities that release oil.2 8 As under Superfund, the defenses are quite

limited." Its coverage of oil spills makes the Clean Water Act broader
than Superfund and uniquely applicable in some major episodes of natural resource damage. Conversely, the Clean Water Act is limited to
navigable waterways and contains relatively low limits on liability." In
addition, Superfund altered the availability of damages under the Clean
Water Act. While section 311 originally provided automatically for restoration or replacement costs, Superfund's damage assessment procedures now apply to natural resource damages under the Clean Water
Act as well.31
Other federal legislation authorizes natural resource damage
24. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1982).
25. Id. § 1321(f)(1).
26. Id. § 1321(f)(4).
27. Id. § 1321(f)(1) (referring to the coverage of 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3) (1982)).
28. Id.
29. Id. These defenses include an act of God, an act of war, negligence of the U.S. government, and an act or omission of a third party. Id. These exceptions to liability have been construed
narrowly.
30. Id. Liability is limited to $125 per gross ton of barges, $150 per gross ton of other vessels,
or $250,000, whichever is greater. Id. For onshore and offshore facilities, total liability is limited to
$50,000,000. Id. § 1321(f)(2) & (3).
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1986) (stating that regulations for damage assessment apply "for the purposes of this chapter and section 1321(f)(4) and (5) of title 33 [the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act]"); id. § 9607(f)(2)(C) (granting rebuttable presumption to "[a]ny
determination or assessment of damages to natural resources for the purposes of this chapter and
section 1321 of title 33 [the Federal Water Pollution Control Act] made by a Federal or State
trustee in accordance with the regulations promulgated under section 9651(c) of this title"). Arguably, the subsequent passage of Superfund amends implicitly the restoration cost methodology of
the Clean Water Act. The Department of the Interior, however, explains that as long as the damages collected are ultimately used for restoration, no inconsistency exists. 52 Fed. Reg. 9042, 9050
(1987) (Type A damage assessment regulations). The latter view is questionable because the damages recovered under other Superfund methodologies may be inadequate to accomplish the complete restoration costs that were recoverable under § 311 of the Clean Water Act.
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awards in specific circumstances. The Deepwater Port Act of 1974 authorizes recovery for damage resulting from deepwater port oil discharges,"2 including damage to "the natural resources of the marine
environment, or the coastal environment of any nation."3 3 The Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act also provides recovery for damages, including "injury to, or destruction of, natural resources" and "loss of use
of natural resources."3 Finally, the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Act also authorizes damages in the event of oil discharge.3 5 None of these laws,
however, specifies how to measure or value damaged natural resources.
Although these acts may be important in individual instances of natural
resource damage, their limited coverage renders them inapplicable to
most injuries to public natural resources.
C.

State Statutes and Common Law

Even before the enactment of the federal statutes, state commonlaw precedent authorized state recovery for damages to publicly held
natural resources. In addition, many state legislatures have passed laws
explicitly permitting and guiding the recovery of these damages. Because Superfund did not preempt these state laws, 6 the states apparently may choose whether to recover under state or federal law.
Common-law authority for state recovery of natural resource damages derives from the traditional principle that government has a proprietary interest in public natural resources.37 When these resources are
32. Deepwater Port Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-627, 88 Stat. 2126 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§
1501-1524 (1982)). Damage recovery authorization is found at 33 U.S.C. § 1517(d) & (e) (1982).
33. See 33 U.S.C. § 1517(m)(2) (1982). This law provides that the owner and operator of a
vessel at a deepwater port shall be liable "for cleanup costs and for damages that result from a
discharge of oil." Id. § 1517(d).
34. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 95-372, § 303(a)(2)(C) & (D), 92 Stat.
629, 674 (1978) (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1356 (1982)).
35. Trans-Alaska Pipeline Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, 87 Stat. 576 (1973) (codified at 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1651-1655 (1982)). Under this legislation, the holder of the pipeline right of way in a region
shall be liable "for such damages, and without regard to ownership of any affected lands, structures, fish, wildlife, or biotic or other natural resources relied upon by Alaska Natives, Native
organizations, or others for subsistence or economic purposes." 43 U.S.C. § 1653(a)(1) (1982). In
addition, vessels are liable under this Act for all damages resulting from a discharge of oil into the
environment. Id. § 1653(c)(1).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a) (1982) (providing that "[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed
or interpreted as preempting any State from imposing any additional liability or requirements with
respect to the release of hazardous substances within such State"). Of course, government plaintiffs may recover only once for any given damage to natural resources. Superfund provides that a
"person who receives compensation for removal costs or damages or claims pursuant to any other
Federal or State law shall be precluded from receiving compensation for the same removal costs or
damages or claims as provided in this chapter." Id. § 9614(b).
37. See, e.g., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 408 (1948); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519,
534 (1896), overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
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injured, the state may sue under parens patriae trustee authority.3 8
Early on, the United States Supreme Court recognized that "the state
has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in
all the earth and air within its domain.'"" Several states recognize
parens patriae authority and, although it is not used frequently, sufficient case law supports recovery under this theory.40 Some important
limitations on parens patriae precedents, however, render the theory
an incomplete authority for recovering damages for harm done to public
41
resources.

Numerous states have enacted legislation authorizing natural resource damages.42 The breadth of these state laws varies widely. Some
states, including Alaska, 43 California,44 and Minnesota, 45 have broad
38. See generally W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 171-82 (1977); Halter &
Thomas, Recovery of Damages by States for Fish and Wildlife Losses Caused by Pollution, 10
ECOLOGY L.Q. 5, 9-13 (1982); Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471 (1970); Note, State Protection of its Economy and
Environment: Parens Patriae Suits for Damages, 6 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 411 (1970); Annotation, State's Standing to Sue on Behalf of Its Citizens, 42 A.L.R. FED. 23 (1979).
39. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907). Thus, a state may bring a
claim to protect "the atmosphere, the water and the forests within its territory, irrespective of the
assent or dissent of the private owners of the land most immediately concerned." Hudson County
Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908); see also Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto
Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 604 (1982).
40. See, e.g., Maine v. MN Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097, 1099 (D. Me. 1973); Department of
Natural Resources v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1060, 1067 (D. Md. 1972); Department of
Fish & Game v. S.S. Bournemouth, 307 F. Supp. 922, 925 (C.D. Cal. 1969); Department of Envtl.
Protection v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 133 N.J. Super. 375, 388-89, 336 A.2d 750, 759 (App.
Div. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 69 N.J. 102, 351 A.2d 337 (1976); State v. Bowling Green, 38
Ohio St. 2d 281, 283, 313 N.E.2d 409, 411 (1974); State Dep't of Fisheries v. Gillette, 27 Wash.
App. 815, 819-20, 621 P.2d 764, 766-67 (1980).
41. See Note, Defining the Appropriate Scope of Superfund Natural Resource Damage
Claims: How Great an Expansion of Liability?, 5 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 197, 201-02 (1985)
(authored by Thomas Newlon). Newlon notes that these damages may be limited to navigable
waters or wildlife. Id. at 202. In addition, some courts have denied money damages, limiting
parens patriaeto injunctive relief. As a consequence of these and other restrictions, litigants rarely
invoke the parens patriae doctrine. Id. at 201-02 n.39.
42. See [State Laws-Master Index] Env't Rep. (BNA) 211:0115 (1988). The Environment
Reportercites 28 states that provide statutorily for damages for environmental damage. Id. Review
of these statutes indicates that 25 states provide for recovery of natural resource damages. These
states include Alaska, California, Connecticut, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. Id. The list does not include those states that provide liquidated civil penalties for
environmental violations. A somewhat older survey of state attorneys general found 25 states that
provided for state recovery of "compensatory damages for the destruction of fish and wildlife."
Halter & Thomas, supra note 38, at 9 n.25. The list of these 25 states is not congruent with the list
compiled from the Environment Reporter.
43. See ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.758(d) (1987). Alaska's law provides for civil penalties, not
damages, but these penalties are related to the extent of natural resource damage. For oil pollution, the penalty shall vary according to the "toxicity, degradability and dispersal characteristics of
the oil" as well as the "sensitivity and productivity of the receiving environment." Id. These penal-
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and apparently effective authority to recover for damage to natural resources. Other states have more limited authority, applying only to oil
spills 4 6 or to criminal violations.47 When applicable, state laws typically
permit recovery of the costs of restoring fish and wildlife. Some states
simplify this process by relying on the value tables of the American
Fisheries Society4 s or by establishing their own tables for valuing the
loss of individual members of varying species. 9
In some cases, state law provides a framework for recovery of the
full measure of natural resource damages. New York's Assistant Attorney General has observed that a "state's own statutes and authorities
may well provide a more comprehensive remedy than [an action under
ties may not exceed $10 per gallon of oil spilled in an environment with "significant aquatic resources" and $1 per gallon of oil in an "environment without significant aquatic resources." Id. §
46.03.758(b)(1).
44. See CAL. HARB. & NAy. CODE § 293 (West Supp. 1989). California law establishes liability
for "any damage or injury to the natural resources of the state, including, but not limited to,
marine and wildlife resources, caused by the discharge or leakage of petroleum, fuel oil, or hazardous substances." Id.
45. See MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 115B.04 (1)(c) (West 1985). The Minnesota Environmental Response and Liability Act makes persons who release hazardous substances liable for "[a]ll
damages
for any injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources."
46. See, e.g., Maine Oil Discharge Prevention and Pollution Control Act, Ma. Rav. STAT. ANN.
tit. 38, § 551 (1978); Massachusetts Rules for the Prevention and Control of Oil Pollution in the
Waters of the Commonwealth § 9.02 (1973), reprinted in [State Water Laws] Env't Rep. (BNA)
806:0553 to 0554 (1988).
47. See N.Y. ENmL. CONSERv. LAW § 71-2723 (McKinney 1981) (providing criminal penalties
including the cost of "restoring to its original state the area where a substance was unlawfully
released").
48. See Comments of the Am. Petroleum Inst. on Dep't of Interior Request for Additional
Comments on Dev. of Regulations on Natural Resource Damage Assessment, at 6 (May 31, 1985)
(source on file with Author) (stating that "most states use the fish tables developed by the American Fisheries Society"), responding to Request for Additional Information, 50 Fed. Reg. 1550
(1985). See AMERICAN FISHERIES SocIETY, Pub. No. 13, MONETARY VALUES OF FRESHWATER FISH AND
FISH-KILL COUNTING GUIDELINES (1982) (most recent publication of the Society). The values contained in this document are based primarily on "hatchery production costs" for replacement. Id. at
3. The American Fisheries Society also published Monetary Values of Fish in 1970 and Reimbursement Values for Fish in 1978. This table is used, for example, by Florida (FLA. STAT. §
403.141(3) (1972)) and Virginia (see NOAA REPORT, infra note 80, at 94-95). Reliance on these
tables is representative of presumptive values for damaged resources. See State Dep't of Pollution
Control v. International Paper Co., 329 So. 2d 5, 8 (Fla. 1976) (holding that due process requires
an opportunity to rebut use of the tables in individual cases).
49. The State of Oregon specified these values in the statute. Under this law the destruction
of an elk costs $750, of a gray squirrel costs $10, and of a salmon or steelhead trout costs $125. OR.
REv. STAT. § 466.890 (1987). Following the Santa Barbara oil spill, California placed specific values
on hundreds of species, including sponges and anemones. The values ranged from roughly onetenth of one cent per Northern Anchovy to $21,000 for each gray whale. Hazardous and Toxic
Waste Disposal Field Hearings:Joint Hearings Before the Subcomms. on Environmental Pollution and Resource Protection of the Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 316-53 (1979) (statement of Edwin J. Dubiel, California Deputy Attorney General)
[hereinafter Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal Hearings].
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Superfund or the Clean Water Act] in some circumstances."5 0 The inconsistent and incomplete coverage of state liability statutes, however,
makes Superfund a superior source of recovery for most natural resource damage.5 1 Consequently, Superfund and the attendant Department of the Interior regulations probably will assume paramount
importance in determining the scope of future natural resource
damages.
III. VALUSS ATTRIBUTABLE TO NATURAL RESOURCES
The first difficulty in valuation is determining the meaning of value
itself and then determining which value characteristics of natural resources should be compensable. This axiological process is a precursor
to an assessment of valuation methods. Congress has offered little guidance in evaluating the types of value that are compensable. In the Fish
and Wildlife Conservation Act of 1980, Congress declared only that
"[f]ish and wildlife are of ecological, educational, aesthetic, cultural,
recreational, economic, and scientific value to the Nation.""2 Yet this
listing of value types obscures the most crucial questions. Surely wildlife has ecological value, but what does that mean? Does Congress intend to protect wildlife's ecological value to human beings, to other
wildlife, or to the ecosystem as a whole? What does economic value
mean? In a sense, all these values are economic, because valuation and
assessment of damages necessitate that the value be monetized. Thus,
these classifications offer little assistance in identifying types of potentially compensable value.
A more useful approach recognizes at least three analytically distinct types of natural resource value that could be compensable: use
50.

Johnson, Natural Resource Damage Assessments Under CERCLA: Flawed Regulations

May Limit Recoveries, 2 NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J., July 1987, at 3, 3. In addition to better
procedures for recovery, the state authority sometimes may permit government claims for damage
to resources on purely private land, unlike Superfund. See supra note 14.

51. See, e.g., Note, supra note 41, at 201 (observing that "[tihe broad sweep of these
[Superfund] provisions is especially striking when compared with previous common law doctrines
and statutes"). Thus, Colorado's Attorney General emphasized that "Congress created this
[Superfund] claim in recognition of the inadequacies of tort law in dealing with environmental

damage cases brought by the states on behalf of present and future generations of their citizens."
Plaintiff's Reply Brief on the Issue of the State's Role as Public Trustee at 4, State v. Cotter Corp.,
Civ. No. 83-C-2389 (May 22, 1986).
52. 16 U.S.C. § 2901(a)(1) (1982). An environmental ethicist adds to this list "life support

value," "genetic diversity value," "cultural symbolization value," "historic value," "characterbuilding value," "therapeutic value," and "religious value." H. ROLSTON, PHILOSOPHY GONE WILD:
ESSAYS INENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 184-87 (1986). There is considerable merit in some of Rolston's
analysis of these values, but one may doubt whether Congress intended these values to be compensable under Superfund and whether tools exist for even rough quantification of these values.
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value, existence value, and intrinsic value."' Use value recognizes that
natural resources only have value to humans when the resources are
used for practical human ends, such as for fishing or hunting. Use value
seeks to measure the monetary importance of the loss of these human
uses. Existence value acknowledges that the presence of natural resources, even unused, may have value to humans. For example, some
people may want to preserve the availability of resources for future generations. Intrinsic value recognizes that natural resources may have
value independent of humans, based on their status as natural creatures
or objects. This section examines these three types of value and evaluates their legitimacy as approaches to valuing natural resource damages.
A.

Use Value

Use value is simply the worth of natural resources to the people
who use them. When a family goes fishing, it uses natural resources in a
consumptive fashion. The continued presence of the fish has some obvious economic value for this family, which expended resources such as
license fees and travel costs in order to go fishing. A 1975 United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) study found that some twenty million Americans participated in "sport hunting," spending nearly six billion dollars in the process. 4 When the same family goes bird watching,
they still use and value the resources, but in a nonconsumptive way.
The magnitude of nonconsumptive use of natural resources considerably exceeds even consumptive uses.5 5 The use value of natural resources
is one logical tool for monetizing the loss of those resources. The language of Superfund refers to use value as a factor to be considered in
resource valuation.5
Commentators advance several reasons for employing use value
when assessing the worth of natural resources. Use value for public resources approximates market value for private resources, which is the
standard measure of damages in our capitalist system. Sometimes even
publicly held natural resources have an established value in the private
market. For example, a forest may be used as lumber, or fish may be
used as food. In these cases the law often uses market value when as53. The literature in this field has yet to agree on a standardized set of terms for these value
types. Existence value, for example, is used in several different ways. The definitions of these
terms for the purpose of this Article are set forth in the text, but the reader should be aware that
the terms may have a different meaning in other articles.
54. See Shaw, Problems in Wildlife Valuation in NaturalResource Management, in VALUATION OF WILDLAND REsOURCE BENEFrrs 221, 225 (G. Peterson & A. Randall eds. 1984).
55. See id. Studies have shown that Americans spent 478 million days engaged in sport hunting in 1975, but 1.6 billion days participating in wildlife observation. Id.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(2) (1982).
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sessing damage to resources57 On other occasions, courts use reduction
in land value to measure the damages from natural resource destruction
on a given site." The market usually measures the use value of resources to purchasers. Thus, even if land and market values are not
available for state-owned natural resources, common-law authority
finds the use value of these resources through other tools. 9 The significance of common-law precedent is indicated by Senator Alan Simpson's
floor discussion of Superfund, in which he called for the use of "traditional legal rules for calculating damages" to natural resources.6 0
The early cases upholding the regulation of public resources by the
states also relied on use value. For example, one case noted bluntly that
"the source of the police power as to game birds . . . flows from the
duty of the State to preserve for its people a valuable food supply.""
Much of the early nature conservation movement was a scientific movement geared toward using resources effectively in order "to guarantee
sustained economic well-being." 2 Focusing on the use value of natural
resources is consistent with a long tradition of United States law.
Historical reliance on use value is not without justification. Use
value is more precise and less speculative than other types of resource
value because it isolates the extent to which people "put their money
where their mouth is." Use value measures actual behavior, rather than
attitudes, and therefore is a more certain means of ascertaining
damages.
Courts in other contexts also have recognized the importance of behavioral evidence of value, such as that provided by use value. The Su57. See, e.g., Chevron Oil Co. v. Snellgrove, 253 Miss. 356, 367, 175 So. 2d 471, 474 (1965)
(using market value for timber); Nash & Windfohr v. Edens, 109 S.W.2d 496, 500 (Tex. Ct. App.
1937) (using market value for damaged strawberry plants); State Dep't of Fisheries v. Gillette, 27
Wash. App. 815, 824, 621 P.2d 764, 768 (1980) (using market value of fish in hatchery).
58. See, e.g., Farny v. Bestfield Builders, Inc., 391 A.2d 212, 214 (Del. 1978) (discussing loss
of land value from harm to shade trees); Fiske v. Moczik, 329 So. 2d 35, 37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1976) (discussing loss of land value from death of ornamental trees); Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Mangan, 189 Okla. 166, 168, 114 P.2d 454, 456 (1941) (discussing loss of land value from damage to
soil and shade trees); Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc. v. Anderson, 524 S.W.2d 681, 687 (Tex. 1975) (discussing loss of land value from polluted creek).
59. The concept that statutes customarily should be interpreted in a manner consonant with
pre-existing common law is a long standing maxim of statutory construction. See MODEL STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ACT § 15(4) (1965), reprinted in C. NUTTING & R. DICKERSON, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 437 (5th ed. 1978). In this instance, the statutory terms "injury,"
"loss," and "destruction" parallel roughly the harms compensable under common-law damages.
See, e.g., Wood v. Security Mut. Life Ins. Co., 112 Neb. 66, 198 N.W. 573 (1924) (defining damages
as "loss, injury or deterioration" of a legally protected interest). While pre-existing common law
should not control the interpretation of Superfund, it is certainly relevant.
60. 126 CONG. REC. S15,008 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980).
61. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 534 (1895).
62. Hart, The EnvironmentalMovement: Fulfillment of the RenaissanceProphecy?, 20 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 501, 517 (1980).
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preme Court denied standing to an environmental group because the
"alleged injury will be felt directly only by those who use" the national
park. 3 In determining whether environmental groups may sue to protect a given nature area, the Second Circuit granted standing only to
"those who by their activities and conduct have exhibited a special interest" in "the aesthetic, conservational, and recreational aspects of
power development."6 Economics largely relies on behavioral evidence
and rejects the relative untrustworthiness of purely hypothetical opinions. The concept of public use value also underlies the parens patriae
authority of the state to recover for damaged natural resources.25
Although the argument for use value rests largely on precedent and
economics, and therefore may seem callow and selfish when juxtaposed
against other ways of valuing nature, the advocate of use value need not
yield the moral and philosophical high ground. The market reflects a
degree of human freedom of choice, a point Ronald Dworkin emphasized in A Matter of Principle. Government may reasonably protect
parkland because of market imperfections, but if it protects parkland
for paternalistic reasons or contrary to popular will, it is undemocratic.
Dworkin criticizes, for example, a hypothesized government intervention for parkland based on "a superior conception of what a truly
worthwhile life is." 6 Such government intervention is not "liberal" and,
63. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972). The Court further held that "a mere
'interest in a problem,' no matter how longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified the
organization is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by itself to render the organization 'adversely affected' or 'aggrieved."' Id. at 739. In United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 685 (1972), the Court upheld standing because of
plaintiff's "allegations that their members used the forests, streams, mountains and other resources in the Washington metropolitan area for camping, hiking, fishing, and sightseeing." Id. at
685. This concept even carries over to Justice Douglas's famous dissent in Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. at 741 (Douglas, J., dissenting). While Douglas put forth the controversial proposition
that natural features receive judicial standing in their own right, he suggested that their rights
should be vindicated in court by "those people who have so frequented the place as to know its
values and wonders." Id. at 752.
64. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d
Cir. 1965).
65. See Odom v. Deltona Corp., 341 So. 2d 977, 981 (Fla. 1976). The court stated:
The basis of the title status of sovereignty lands rests initially on the common law of England
under which the Crown held the title to the beds of navigable and tide waters, in trust for the
people of the realm who had rights of navigation, commerce, bathing, and fishing and other
recognized easements.
Id.
66. See R. DWORFIN. A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 202 (1985). Dworkin thus rejects government
policy based on deference to the intrinsic value that may be found in nature. Dworkin does not
hesitate to approve government intervention in the economy when necessary to promote human
equality. See also Fedkiw, Coming Back to Market Value and Valuation for the Great Lakes
Fisheries, 116 TRANSACTIONS A. FISHERIES Soc'Y. 346, 346 (1987) (stating that the marketplace is
"the commonplace and commonsense approach to valuation in a democratic society").
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presumably, is totalitarian in impulse.6 7 Charles Meyer similarly criticizes the "absolutist" impulse of some environmentalists and concludes
that the "economists' model . . . seems to me more in keeping with
democratic theory in a pluralistic society."6 8 Indeed, "ecoauthoritarianism" has been proposed as a response to environmental degradation. 9
Use value is a plausible, intellectually respectable measure for determining the worth of natural resources. Complete reliance on use
value has some shortcomings, however. Contrary to the implications of
use value, greater public use of recreation sites actually may diminish
the recognized public value of those facilities.7 0 Most significantly, use
value ignores the reality that natural resources may have worth beyond
their use by humans.7 1 Even unused resources may have some value to
society. Surely a fish is worth something, even if a fisherman never
catches it. Some state courts have affirmed this view. For example, a
New York state court in upholding the New York Endangered Species
Act held: "The police power is not to be limited to guarding merely the
physical or material interest of the citizen. His moral, intellectual and
spiritual needs may also be considered. The eagle is preserved, not for
its use but for its beauty. '72 The following section explores the significance of nonuse values.
67. R. DWORKIN, supra note 66; see also Farber, From Plastic Trees to Arrow's Theorem,
1986 U. ILL. L. Rav. 337, 351 (stating that "[a]s the example of religion shows, even when some
individuals agree with certitude about the fundamental attributes of the universe, they are not
justified in imposing their views on others, or in using the machinery of the state to further their
views"). Significantly, Farber shows how the marketplace also falls short of a justifiable allocation
of resources. Id. at 352-54.
68. Meyer, An Introductionto Environmental Thought: Some Sources and Some Criticisms,
50 Ian. L.J. 426, 452-53 (1975); see also Sagoff, Where Ickes Went Right or Reason and Rationality in EnvironmentalLaw, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 265, 288 (1987) (stating that "[t]he prospect of intervening with the freedom of individuals to educate their judgment or to improve their preferences,
of course, strikes us as dangerous because it seems to invite tyranny").
69. See generally W. OPHULS, ECOLOGY AND THE PoLrrTcs OF ScAncrrY (1977). Ophuls suggests
that man "may simply not be intelligent enough to grasp the issues" attendant to ecological scarcity. Id. at 160. The better future society in Ophuls's view must be "more authoritarian and less
democratic than the industrial societies of today." Id. at 163.
70. See, e.g., Cicchetti & Smith, Congestion, Quality Deteriorationand Optimal Use: Wilderness Recreation in the Spanish Peaks Primitive Area, 2 Soc. SCL RES. 15 (1973); McConnell &
Sutinen, An Analysis of Congested Recreation Facilities, in 3 ADVANCES IN APPLIED MICRO-ECONOMICS 9 (K. Smith & A. Witte eds. 1984) [hereinafter APPLIED MICRO-ECONOMICS]; Menz & Mullen, Expected Encounters and Willingness to Pay for Outdoor Recreation, 57 LAND EcON. 33
(1981).
71. For this reason, commentators have argued that "relying on direct use values alone would
significantly understate the total benefits of water quality improvements." Fisher & Raucher, IntrinsicBenefits of Improved Water Quality: Conceptual and Empirical Perspectives,in 3 APPLIED
MICRO-ECoNOMICS, supra note 70, at 38.
72. A.E. Nettleton Co. v. Diamond, 27 N.Y.2d 182, 192, 264 N.E.2d 118, 123, 315 N.Y.S.2d
625, 632 (1970) (quoting Barret v. New York, 220 N.Y. 423, 428, 116 N.E. 99, 101 (1917)).
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B. Existence Value
Emphasis on market value for natural resources, or even a broader
conception of use value, strikes many people as exalting economics
above other socially held values. In the context of natural resources,
unthinking reliance on economic principles would recommend selling
the Grand Canyon to the highest bidder for commercial development, if
that sale would yield the most profit. Not long ago, Milton Friedman
proposed closing the national parks in which the commercial value of
lumber or minerals exceeded the value of recreational use. 73 The demo-

cratic process has rejected this result unequivocally. The Wilderness
Act of 1964, for example, prohibits human use of wilderness areas when
the use is incompatible with preserving the land in its natural condition.74 The Alaskan National Interests Lands Conservation Act of 1980
similarly preserves certain lands and waters for "the benefit, use, education, and inspiration of present and future generations. '75 This exemplary statute demonstrates the presence of a benefit beyond use value.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged expressly "the public interest in
preserving reaches of wild rivers and wilderness areas. "76
The worth of natural resources beyond their use value is labeled
existence value.7 7 Existence value has three distinct subparts. First,
humans may place their own "option value" on the preservation of natural resources. While I have never visited Yosemite National Park, I
might want to do so someday and, therefore, I value its preservation.
Retaining the option of future use intuitively has an economic importance. Second, humans may obtain "vicarious value" from natural resources. Even if I never intend to visit Yosemite National Park, I may
still value its preservation. The knowledge that a given natural environ73. See generally M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962).
74. See Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1982). The National Wilderness Preservation System permits undeveloped federal land "where the earth and its community of life are
untrammeled by man." Id. The Act also provides "roadless" areas to be preserved in their "primitive" state. Id. §§ 1132(b), (c). See generally McCloskey & Desautels, A Primer on Wilderness
Law and Policy, 13 Envtl L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,278 (Sept. 1983). A primary purpose of this
legislation was to guarantee that these lands would be preserved in their original, natural state.
See Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F. Supp. 842 (D. Colo. 1985).
75. 16 U.S.C. § 3101(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
76. Udall v. Federal Power Comm'n, 387 U.S. 428, 450 (1967).
77. One of the more entertaining expressions of existence value is in Johnson, Recreation,
Fish, Wildlife and the Public Land Law Review Commission, 6 LAND & WATER L. REV. 283, 289
n.18 (1970):
Motorbikes are a particular bane in the wilderness. But, it is said, many people like to ride
motorbikes on mountain trails. This led me to invite a number of friends to fill in the blank in
the following sentence: Because people like to ride motorbikes on mountain trails they should
be allowed to do so, is like saying that because they like to
on mountain trails they
should be allowed to do so. Unfortunately none of the entries were printable.
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ment is protected is valuable to some Americans, and vicarious appreciation of nature, therefore, has a demonstrable economic value. Third,
preservation of natural resources may have "intertemporal value." Even
if I have no interest in visiting Yosemite National Park, I may want my
offspring or their descendents to have the chance to see the park. The
ability to bequeath natural resources to future generations also may
have measurable monetary value.
Natural resource damages can capture these nonuse existence values. The strongest argument for including existence values is that they
indubitably exist. 8 Option value is logically the simplest form of existence value. In several well-established private markets, such as the
market for agricultural commodities, traders are accustomed to paying
a substantial sum for a future option or right to use a product. Analytically, option value applies to environmental resources as well. 9 It is not
uncommon for a person to desire to see the Grand Canyon at least once
in his lifetime, nor is it unusual to postpone this visit until later in life.
Presumably, people ascribing to this view would pay something to preserve their ability to see the Grand Canyon at a later date. The magnitude of option value is still uncertain, however.8 0 An analogous concept
is referred to as quasi-option value. Quasi-option value represents unknown latent benefits from natural resources. This value is used often
for endangered species for which the full range of future benefits is unknown."' For example, an endangered plant species may possess undis78. See, e.g., C. COOPER, ECONOMIC EVALUATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT 68 (1981); Fisher &
Raucher, supra note 71, at 60; Randall & Peterson, Valuation of Wildland Benefits: An Overview,
in

VALUATION OP WILDLAND RESOURCE BENEFITS

38 (G. Peterson & A. Randall eds. 1984).

79. The first and leading exposition of option value as applied to environmental resources is
Weisbrod, Collective-Consumption Services of Individual-ConsumptionGoods, 78 Q.J. EcON. 471
(1964). Weisbrod argued that the true value of national parks significantly exceeds their use value.
For a rigorous explication of the economics of option value, see Bishop, Resource Valuation Under
Uncertainty: Theoretical Principles for Empirical Research, in 4 APPLIED MICRO-ECONOMICS,
supra note 70, at 133-52 (K. Smith ed. 1986).
80. See, e.g., NATIONAL OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., THE USE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS IN
VALUING NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES: AN OvERVmW 32-33 (E. Yang, R. Dower, M. Menessee eds.
1984) [hereinafter NOAA REPORT] (discussing studies, including some which showed a negative
option value). Some of the uncertainty about the existence of positive option value are discussed in

Fisher & Raucher, supra note 71, in 3 APPLIED

MICRO-ECONOMICS,

supra note 70, at 40-42. The

uncertainty relates primarily to the unpredictability of future supply of or demand for the commodity in question. In the situation "that seems most relevant for water-quality-related analyses,"
the authors conclude that option value is probably both positive and significant.
81. This concept may have been best expressed by Justice Douglas, who wrote:
A teaspoon of living earth contains 5 million bacteria, 20 million fungi, one million protozoa,
and 200,000 algae. No living human can predict what vital miracles may be locked in this dab
of life, this stupendous reservoir of genetic materials that have evolved continuously since the
dawn of the earth. For example, molds have existed on earth for about 2 billion years. But
only in this century did we unlock the secret of the penicillins, tetracyclines, and other antibiotics from the lowly molds, and thus fashion the most powerful and effective medicines ever
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covered medical properties capable of curing human disease.
A second form of existence value, called vicarious value, also may
be significant for natural resources.82 Established concern for endangered species partly illustrates this point. Thus, people who will never
use whale products or even see a whale still may be willing to pay something to prevent the extinction of whales.83 A similar concern for wolves
and other species exists.84 One study found that eighty-nine percent of
Americans were willing to pay increased energy costs for protection of
bald eagles, even though most of these people will never share the thrill
of observing these eagles.8 5 The significance of vicarious value also may
discovered by man. Medical scientists still wince at the thought that we might have inadvertently wiped out the rhesus monkey, medically, the most important research animal on earth.
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 750-51 n.8 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Explicit concern for loss
of future benefits through extinction underlies the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540
(1982). See, e.g., Plater, supra note 8, at 823. The House Report on the Act stated that the "value
of this genetic heritage is, quite literally, incalculable." HE. RP. No. 412, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4
(1973).
82. See McConnell, Existence and Bequest Value, in MANAGING AIR QUALITY AND SCENIC
RESOURCES AT NATIONAL PARKS AND WILDERNESS AREAS 255 (R. Rowe & L. Chestnut eds. 1983)
[hereinafter MANAGING Am QUALITY]. McConnell has hypothesized that "existence value may be
relatively more significant than option value." Id.; see also Greenley, Walsh & Young, Option
Value: Empirical Evidence from a Case Study of Recreation and Water Quality, 97 Q.J. ECoN.
657 (1981) (finding option value of the South Platte River Basin to be $23 per person per year and
existence or vicarious value to be $42 per person per year). Several other studies suggest that
existence and option values may be large and may exceed significantly the use value for resources
such as Western wildlife habitat and Grand Canyon air quality. Randall & Stoll, Existence Value
in a Total Valuation Framework, in MANAGING Am QUALITY, supra, at 270-71. A summary of the
available economic studies concluded that existence benefits "may account for a sizable portion of
society's valuation of improved water quality." Fisher & Raucher, supra note 71, at 37; see id. at
47-49 (discussing the specific studies and concluding that existence value was at least half of use
value, if not substantially more).
83. Anderson & Bishop, The Valuation Problem, in NATURAL RESOURCE EcONOMICS 125 (D.
Bromley ed. 1985).
84. Glass & Muth, Pitfalls and Limitations in the Use of Fishery Valuation Techniques, 116
TRANSACTIONS AM. FISHERIES Soc'Y 381, 387 (1987):
The relationship between a large segment of society and the timber wolf provides a good
example of existence values. Many people place a high value on the preservation of this species even though they are extremely unlikely to ever encounter a wolf. Although it is difficult
and costly to measure existence values in monetary terms, the reality of such values is amply
manifested through political action and often demonstrated by donations to resource-related
causes in which the grantors do not use the resource.
Id.
85. See Shaw, supra note 54, at 226. Similarly "both 'saving' Lake Erie from 'dying' and
protecting visibility at the Grand Canyon appear to be widely supported by people who have no
intention of using either." Talhelm, Unrevealed Extramarket Values: Values Outside the Normal
Range of Consumer Choices, in MANAGING Am QUALITY, supra note 82, at 275. A detailed study of
the South Platte River Basin in Colorado found:
About 20 percent of the households interviewed who do not use the River Basin for recreation
activities reported they were willing to pay an average of $25 annually for knowledge of the
existence of the natural aquatic ecosystem and $17 annually to bequeath clean water to future
generations, for a total non-user value of $42 annually.
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be inferred from the broad membership of organizations such as the
Sierra Club, the Audubon Society, the National Wildlife Federation,
and others. 8 Nor is vicarious value a concept that is unique to environmental preservation. Even those people who never anticipate being arrested may value the constitutional rights provided to criminal
defendants.8 7
Finally, natural resources may possess intertemporal value. If society values these resources today, future generations almost certainly
will value the preservation of these resources.88 This generation may regret the extinction of the passenger pigeon because of the actions of
past generations and should consider the consequences that our acts
may have for people living in the future. Intertemporal value is reflected in federal legislation such as the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act,
which directs that "environments shall be protected for the benefit and
enjoyment of present and future generations."'89
These forms of existence value are not only present, but also quite
significant. An elaborate EPA-sponsored study of water quality in
Pennsylvania's Monangahela Valley surveyed the applicable literature
and concluded that "all these studies have found option and existence
values to be substantial-greater than half of the total benefits of enviGreenley, Walsh & Young, supra note 82, at 667.
86. See, e.g., Krutilla, ConservationReconsidered, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 777, 781 (1967). Krutilla observed: "Subscriptions to the World Wildlife Fund are of the same character. The funds are
employed predominantly in an effort to save exotic species in remote areas of the world which few
subscribers to the Fund ever hope to see." Id. Similarly, "[c]ontributions in time, money and aid to
the sea birds damaged in an oil spill is a measure of psychic damage value." Hazardous and Toxic
Waste Disposal Hearings, supra note 49, at 370 (statement of Fred Walgenbach, Senior Resources
Economist, California Dept. of Fish and Game); see also Comments of the State of Colorado In the
Matter of the Proposed Rule for Natural Resource Damage Assessments, at 7 (1986) (source on file
with Author) ("non-use values exist for many resources ... as evidenced by contributions and the
efforts of special interest groups (for example, the non-game wildlife tax checkoff in Colorado
raises millions of dollars annually)"), responding to 53 Fed. Reg. 52,126 to 52,174 (1985).
87. Existence value also may exist for "historical buildings, historical districts, speech dialects . . . and many of the other characteristics that make up the quality of life." McConnell,
supra note 82, in MANAGING Am QuALmTr, supra note 82, at 262. Another author indicates that
existence value is central to "goods" such as "the 1957 Chevrolet, various coins, the Mona Lisa,
national defense, the Empire State Building, and Beethoven's Fifth Symphony." Talhelm, supra
note 85, in MANAGING Am QUALITY, supra note 82, at 278. Still others have suggested that "[o]pera
buffs may place genuine value on knowing that grand opera is performed live in medium-sized
cities like Des Moines." Randall & Stoll, supra note 82, in MANAGING Am QuAUrY, supra note 82,
at 268.
88. Some commentators have argued for a moral imperative to consider the benefits to future
generations. Whether or not such a moral duty exists, many individuals now voluntarily recognize
the interest of future generations. See, e.g., Heal, The IntertemporalProblem, in NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS, supra note 83, at 8-11 (discussing the philosophies of Sidgwick and Rawls
justifying intertemporal concerns on predominantly utilitarian grounds).
89. 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (1982).
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ronmental improvements."9 0 Other studies suggest that the existence
value of parks may be several times greater than the use value.,, These
92
findings are consistent with broader-based social science research.
Although research has suggested that existence value may play a
significant role in assessing the importance of natural resources, some
people remain skeptical. There is no good behavioral test for existence
value.93 Because the concept is demonstrated attitudinally, and not behaviorally, an economist may question how strongly the value is truly
held.94 People who claim that they value educational television often
fail to watch or contribute to their local station. For skeptics, the absence of a behavioral test of existence value renders the concept impos95
sible to measure accurately.
In addition to measurement difficulties, some people question the
importance of existence value in the context of hazardous substance releases. Most releases do not obliterate a significant, well-known natural
resource, but instead cause marginal harms to possibly unrecognized resources, such as water quality or an obscure plant species. While it is
understandable how some people value the existence of a given national
park, it is less clear how these people value the existence of a relatively
small number of plants in a corner of that park. There is evidence,
90. W. DESVOUSGES, V. SMITH & M. McGIvNEY, A COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
FOR ESTIMATING RECREATION AND RELATED BENEFITS OF WATER QUALITY IMPROVEMENTS 1-11 (Environmental Protection Agency Working Paper No. 230-05-83-001, March 1983).
91. See Shaw, supra note 54, at 199. Shaw noted: "Total 'preservation value' was found to be
many times greater than on-site use value for visibility in the Southwestern park lands, and several
times larger than on-site user values for increments to a regional park system in Australia." Id.
(citations omitted).
92. See Gregory, Nonmonetary Measures of Nonmarket Fishery Resource Benefits, 116
TRANSACTIONS AM. FISHERIES Soc'y 374, 377-78 (1987) (stating that "recent social science research
emphasizes both the richness and complexity of people's values and the importance of certain
intrinsic demands that are associated with desires to maintain future options despite uncertainty
(option demands) or simply to preserve valued amenities (existence values)").
93. See Talhelm & Libby, In Search of a Total Value Assessment Framework:SAFR Symposium Overview and Synthesis, 116 TRANSACTIONS AM. FISHERIES Soc'Y 293, 296 (1987) (stating
that "[o]nly through collective action in the public sector, or through voluntary philanthropic activities, do people act in response to existence value, so the value cannot be easily inferred from
observable human activities").
94. See W. DESVOUSGES & V. SKAHEN, TYPE B TECHNICAL INFORMATION DOCUMENT TECHNIQUES TO MEASURE DAMAGES TO NATURAL RESOURCES 1-7 (Department of Interior CERCLA 301
Project, Sept. 1985) (stating that "economists' understanding of indirect use or existence values is
less developed than their understanding of direct use values").
95. See Bishop, Boyle & Welsh, Toward Total Economic Valuation of Great Lakes Fishery
Resources, 116 TRANSACTIONS Am. FISHERIES Soc'y. 339, 339 (1987) (stating that "doubts remain
about whether [existence] values can be measured with sufficient accuracy for policy analysis").
96. See Talhelm, supra note 85, at 280. Talhelm argues that "in analyzing existence value,
the change in quantity ...is essentially meaningless, since the question at hand is the existence
or nonexistence of something." Id. Talhelm notes, however, that even small increments of a national park have some uniqueness of their own and therefore may possess independent existence
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however, that some degree of existence value applies even to nonunique environments or small increments of environmental quality
change.7
Existence value has other troublesome aspects. Environmentalists
as well as economists may question reliance on existence value for natural resources because under the existence value and use value paradigms, nature's only value is its value to human beings. The humanbased, or anthropocentric,"" valuation can prescribe undue environmental destruction. 9 Anthropocentric valuation may lead to "the criminal
conceit that nature is to be considered primarily as a source of raw
materials and energy for human purposes." 10 0 One author criticized a
benefits analysis of the Delaware River that took into account the benefits accruing to fishermen from an increase in the fish population, and
not the benefit accruing to fish, which have no money to sacrifice. 10 1
This view raises a difficult question. Does wildlife, for example, have no
value beyond that to humans, or is wildlife worthwhile-even sacred-on its own terms? The precise source of this value is unclear, but
there is a widespread belief that natural things have some value of their
own. l0 2 Increasingly, this view encompasses inanimate elements of navalue. Id.
97. See Randall & Stoll, supra note 82, in MANAGING AIR QUALITY, supra note 82, at 268-72.
98. See Callicott, Non-Anthropocentric Value Theory and Environmental Ethics, 21 AM.
PHIL. Q. 299, 299 (1984) (stating that "[ain anthropocentric value theory (or axiology), by common
consensus, confers intrinsic value on human beings and regards all other things, including other
forms of life, as being only instrumentally valuable, i.e., valuable only to the extent that they are
means or instruments which may serve human beings").
99. See, e.g., A. LEOPOLD, A SAND CouNTY ALMANAC at viii (1974) (arguing that "[w]e abuse
land because we regard it as a commodity belonging to us"); Weiss, The PlanetaryTrust: Conservation and IntergenerationalEquity, 11 ECOLOGY L.Q. 495, 498 n.13 (1984) (noting that humanbased valuation has "been criticized as calling in its most extreme form for nature to be maintained only to the extent necessary to support continued human existence"). One commentator
calls for a "primary naturalistic" ethic to replace the "secondary, humanistic" concepts implicit in
use and existence value. H. ROLSTON, supra note 52, at 11.
100. H. ROLSTON, supra note 52, at 22. In the perspective of one commentator, it "was presumed that the only interest reflected in the legal system was the human one and that all values
were derived from calculations concerning usefulness to humans. It is now time to recognize that
wildlife have their own interests . . . ." Favre, Wildlife Rights: The Ever-Widening Circle, 9
ENvmL. L. 241, 259 (1979); see also Randall, Total Economic Value as a Basis for Policy, 116
TRANSACTIONS AM. FISHERIES Soc'y 325, 326 (1987) (stating that "animals may be seen as 'having a
good of their own,' possessing rights, or being the beneficiaries of duties and obligations arising
from ethical principles incumbent on humans"). Randall goes on to caution that "it is legitimate to
worry that the future of some particular environmental entities may be precarious if they have no
claims beyond those that derive directly from human caring." Id. at 326 n.4.
101. B. ACKERMAN, S. ROSE-ACKERMAN, J. SAwYER & D. HENDERSON, THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QuALrrY 139 (1974).
102. See, e.g., Sagoff, On Preserving the Natural Environment, 84 YALE L.J. 205 (1974) (arguing that the American cultural heritage and our basic ideals provide a basis for valuing nature);
Tribe, From Environmental Foundations to ConstitutionalStructures: Learning from Nature's
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ture, such as rocks, as well as animals."' If this view is accurate, then it
fundamentally undermines an exclusive reliance on the existence value
and use value paradigms.
Making nature's value entirely dependent on human wants and
desires creates additional problems. Under existence value, the worth of
nature can be manipulated by keeping the public ignorant of ecological
damage. 104 For example, anyone familiar with environmental law is
aware of the great importance that was placed on the preservation of
the endangered snail darter, primarily due to its existence value. Suppose that an endangered cousin of the snail darter lived in other
streams, but we were wholly unaware of its existence. 10 5 Our lack of
awareness translates into a lack of existence value for this species."0 6
Existence value thus creates a perverse incentive to keep the public ig07
norant of the characteristics and attributes of the natural world.
Moreover, under the existence value paradigm the economically optimal
remedy would be to inform the public that a site will be restored and
then fail to do so. Fooling the public would capture much of the existence value without expending the costs of actual restoration. While
this approach does little to preserve natural resources, it is the most
cost-effective alternative.
The occasional practice of "planting" plastic artificial trees in place
of real trees provides an even more telling example. '° Humanity might
Future, 84 YALE LJ. 545 (1975) (criticizing Sagoff and arguing for a process-oriented recognition of
nature's value). Other commentators have offered religious reasons for independently valuing nature. See Callicott, supra note 98, at 302; Yi-Fu Tuan, supra note 1, at 244. No consensus view is
apparent. See generally Callicott, supra note 98 (analyzing the theories for ascribing intrinsic
value to nature); Farber, supra note 67 (observing the varying approaches and preferring a universal intuitivist emotion that living things possess some value); Higgs, supra note 2, at 429 (noting
that "[m]any philosophical arguments have pointed to the need for greater concern for nature and
for moral systems that stress the moral rights of certain species").
103. See, e.g., Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-TowardLegal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S.CAL. L. REv. 450, 456 n.26 (1972); see also Seed, Anthropocentrism?,in ECOPHILOSOPHY
5, 11 (G. Sessions & B. Devall eds. 1983) (noting that "the distinction between 'life' and 'lifeless' is
a human construct").
104. See Randall & Stoll, supra note 82, in MANAGING Am QUALITY, supra note 82, at 270
("[e]xistence value is, therefore, quite volatile in the face of new information").
105. This supposition is actually quite realistic, as "[niew species of darters are being constantly discovered and classified-at the rate of about one per year." Tennessee Valley Auth. v.
Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 159 n.7 (1978).
106. See id. Until its discovery in 1973, the snail darter's existence demand was zero.
107. Under existence valuation, ignorance is made blissful. Indeed, it is not hard to imagine a
case in which the optimal economic result will involve keeping natural resources secret so that they
may be destroyed without perceived loss. Yet our law (both environmental and constitutional) is
based on a contrary assumption, that greater knowledge will benefit the public interest.
108. See, e.g., Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315 (1974).
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some day be persuaded to prefer plastic trees to growing trees. 109
Should this occur, existence value would recognize no harm in replacing
all of nature with man-made objects. One commentator observes, "[I]f
human caring ceased for some reason, environmental values would
evaporate and environmental entities would have no moral claims even
for continued existence."' 1 0 Intuitively, this result seems wrong."' Nature surely must have some value even when humans fail to recognize
it. 1 2 And even if mankind never chooses plastic trees, existence value
may overemphasize the big, "glamorous" mammal species at the ex3
pense of important smaller creatures and plants."
The above criticisms, however, do not support a contention that
existence value is absent or wrong or should be ignored entirely. Rather,
they suggest that existence value is an incomplete measure of the total
value found in natural resources. As a component of resource value, existence value remains well supported.
C.

Intrinsic Value

Existence value ignores the inherent worth possessed by natural
objects and places no weight on the needs or wants of nature." 4 Some
109. The obvious popularity of artificial Christmas trees indoors may presage the increased
acceptance of "artificial nature." Professor Tribe provides several examples of hotels and other
organizations providing simulated natural settings for the pleasure of their visitors. Id. at 1316.
Perhaps even animals will become unnecessary as technology enhances the quality of dioramas.
See also Emond, Co-operation in Nature: A New Foundation for Environmental Law, 22 OsGOODE HALL L.J. 323, 332 (1984) (stating that "[m]any people do not question the integrity of a
society with plastic trees, swimming pools, shopping malls and Disney Worlds").
110. Randall, supra note 100, at 326. While this occurrence may seem far fetched, one author
has emphasized that
conscious public choice can manipulate this learning so that the environments which people
learn to use and want reflect environments that are likely to be available at low cost ...
Much more can be done with plastic trees and the like to give people the feeling that they are
experiencing nature.
Krieger, What's Wrong with Plastic Trees?, 179 SCIENcE 446, 451-53 (1973).
111. Tribe perceives "a growing sense in contemporary industrialized societies that there is
in fact something sacred in the natural." Tribe, supra note 108, at 1337.
112. See Callicott, supra note 98, at 300.
113. See, e.g., D. EHRENFELD, supra note 7, at 180. The article states:
It is no coincidence, for example, that among the Australian mammals, the large showy, beautiful, diurnal ones, those like the big kangaroos that might be seen on safari, are zealously
protected by conservationists, and most are doing fairly well. Yet the small, inconspicuous,
nocturnal marsupials, such as the long-nosed bandicoot and the narrow-footed marsupial
mouse, include a distressingly large number of seriously endangered or recently exterminated
species.
Id. Obviously, members of the insect kingdom generally will receive little existence value and may,
in a case such as mosquitoes, possess negative existence value to many humans.
114. The reader may question whether natural objects have wants. For animate objects, however, the presence of wants is obvious. Animals eat, need affection, and need room to roam. Plants
can communicate effectively their wants by turning brown or drooping.
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ecologists contend that man must recognize his fiduciary obligation to
other species of life.115 According to modern "deep ecologists," all living
things "have inherent value and have moral significance independent of
their use by human beings, or even of human existence."'1 6 Perhaps
only recognition of intrinsic value can protect mankind from a future of
forests comprised of plastic trees." 7
It is not necessarily radical to acknowledge some intrinsic value in
natural resources. Even the great utilitarian Jeremy Bentham argued
that only tyranny denies rights to other animal species." 8 And St. Francis of Assisi reportedly preached to the sparrows and ministered to the
wolves."19 Contemporary philosophical thought, eloquently expressed by
George Santayana, suggests that focus on purely human concerns "is
inspired by the conceited notion that man, or human reason, or the
human distinction between good and evil, is the center and the pivot of
the universe. That is what the mountains and the woods should make
you ashamed to assert.' 20 The thought that nature might possess its
own inherent value is both recurrent and powerful, and is reflected in
environmental regulation, such as the Endangered Species Act.' 2 '
Yet those who ascribe to the intrinsic value of nature may themselves oppose the monetary measurement of that value. Some deep
ecologists, for example, are uncomfortable with the capitalist system's
115. Weiss, supra note 99, at 498 n.14.
116. Elder, Legal Rights for Nature-The Wrong Answer to the Right(s) Question, 22 OsGOODE HALL L.J. 285, 286 (1984). Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess has advocated an awareness
of "the equal right [of all things] to live and blossom" into their own unique forms of self-realization. Naess, The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary, 16 INQUIRY
95, 96 (1973) (emphasis omitted). The principles and theories of the deep ecology movement are
well summarized in Pollack, Reimagining NEPA: Choices for Environmentalists,9 HARV. ENvTL.
L. REv. 359, 401-13 (1985). Central to the paradigm is a rejection of "anthropocentrism, a philosophy holding that things are valuable only insofar as they further human interests." Id. at 405.
Alternatively, this movement is sometimes referred to as deconstructionist ecology. Luke, Notes
for a Deconstructionist Ecology, 11 NEW POL. SCL 21 (1983).
117. Rolston doubts whether we can distinguish between the worth of nature to us and nature's intrinsic worth. Rolston argues that the interests of humans and those of nature are so
congruent that they merge. H. ROLSTON, supra note 52, at 23. Indeed, he suggests confusingly that
"[mI]an can manipulate nature to his best interests only if he first loves her for her own sake." Id.
at 22.
118. J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION § 1, at
381 (1945).
119. According to legend, the saint asked the birds to be quiet while he delivered a sermon to
them and shamed a wolf into repentance. For the tales of Saint Francis of Assisi among the animals, see THE FRANCIS BOOK (R. Gasnick ed. 1980).
120. See Sessions, Ecological Consciousness and ParadigmChange, in DEEP ECOLOGY 39 (M.
Tobias ed. 1985) (quoting Santayana speech at the University of California-Berkeley in 1911).
121. 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (1982); see Plater, supra note 8, at 824-25 (observing that this "philosophical principle was the most difficult articulated amidst congressional hearings or agency proceedings but reflected an important thread that runs through the endangered species cases").
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focus on private property.' 22 For these ecologists, relying on economics
is "technocratic" and the root of environmental degradation; monetary
natural resource damages contribute to the problem rather than the solution. 23 These people refuse to place a monetary value on nature, find124
ing that the very effort demeans the underlying worth of nature.
Their refusal leaves the law only two options: Economically valuing natural resources at zero or at infinity. The former alternative inevitably
creates an incentive to destroy the resources that the naturalist seeks to
protect. 12 The latter is transparently unworkable, as it suggests that
the death of a single fly provides grounds for bankrupting the largest
corporations.' 2 6 While it is indisputably difficult to assess the monetary
value of natural objects, the effort should be made. Otherwise, "treating
the problem as an inherent incapacity of analysis to incorporate the
intangible can only retard the needed development of these important
abilities.' 2 17 No persuasive methodologies, however, objectively and reliably ascertain the intrinsic worth of natural resources.
Arguments for granting intrinsic value to natural objects may suffer
from more fundamental shortcomings. The intrinsic worth of natural
objects is not recognized universally. Aristotle contended that "plants
are created for the sake of animals, and the animals for the sake of
122. See Pollack, supra note 116, at 406-07.
123. An economist has acknowledged that an "economic approach to valuing natural and
environmental resources is explicitly instrumentalist, utilitarian, and homocentric." Randall, supra
note 100, at 326. To deep ecologists, economics plays at most a "minor role" that is "subordinate
to ecological-ethical criteria." Devall, The Deep Ecology Movement, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 299, 312
(1980). Another leading author counterposes "the desire for monetary reward" in our present technocratic view with "the joy of natural experiences" in his future ecological view. T. O'RORDAN,
ENVIRONMENTALISM

300 (1976).

124. See, e.g., Hedgpeth, Seven Ways to Obliteration:Factors of EstuarineDegradiation,in
2 OFFICE OF WATER PLANNING & STANDARDS, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ESTUARINE
POLLUTION CONTROL AND ASSESSMENT

723, 725 (1975), quoted in Halter & Thomas, supra note 38,

at 8 n.22. The article states:
An economist who suggests that we set a money value to the fish or amenity that may be
destroyed by a power plant, and submit the cost-benefit ratio to a public vote, is proposing an
evil and senseless procedure ....
The idea of assigning a dollars and cents value to life-any
life-can lead to the end of life on earth ....
Id.
125. See Yang, Valuing Natural Resource Damages:Economics for CERCLA Lawyers, 14
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,311, 10,312 (Aug. 1984).
126. Valuing natural resources at infinity also reflects a lack of understanding of nature. As
Darwin proved, destruction of some elements of nature is itself natural. When a snake eats a
mouse, it is fulfilling nature, not destroying it. Humans themselves are part of nature and should
not be hesitant to destroy some other parts of nature when necessary. The desire to protect nature
may be best understood as an effort to prevent unnecessary damage.
127. Tribe, supra note 108, at 1322 (emphasis in original). True deep ecologists, however, will
remain unpersuaded. To them, no incentive system will suffice, as a revolutionary change in people's attitudes is the only answer to environmental degradation.
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man.' ' 12s The Book of Genesis plainly sets forth man's "dominion" over
the beasts of nature. 129 This view has persisted through Roman law,'
and the writings of St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Kant, and Sir
Francis Bacon.13 ' John Passmore, a recent philosopher of nature, suggests that if plants, animals, and landscapes were treated like persons
and thus part of a moral community, humanity could not civilize the
world or even continue to live.' The obvious violence and selfishness
of the principle of survival of the fittest suggest an inherent immorality
of nature itself. s A river cannot have moral qualms about drowning a
34
person, so why should a person have doubts about polluting a river?1
On the other hand, man's greater moral capabilities may impose a cor35
respondingly higher moral duty.1

Perhaps the argument over the intrinsic worth of natural resources
is largely pointless. Political realists contend that concern for inherent
animal welfare lacks public credibility. Whatever the metaphysical basis for nature's intrinsic value, the advocates of this position risk being
considered impractical and fuzzy-headed, if not outright crackpots.
Their arguments are treated with more ridicule than respect.' Perhaps
these critics are partly correct. As long as government is making the
legal rules and as long as only humans vote, the concerns of nature
never will be reflected directly in our nation's governmental policy.
Most environmental laws enacted to date focus on protecting people's
128. 1 ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1256 (W. Ellis trans. 1962).
129. Genesis 1:26. By contrast, however, the well-known biblical story of Noah may be seen
as "a symbol of the sanctity and uniqueness of every living species." S. YAFFEE, PROHIBITIVE POLICY: IMPLEMENTING THE FEDERAL ENDANGERED SPECIES AcT 28 (1982).
130. See Favre, supra note 100, at 243-45 (summarizing this history).
131. See J. PASSMORE, MAN'S RESPONSBILITY FOR NATURE 3-27 (1974) (summarizing this philosophical tradition).
132. Id. at 126.
133. See Callicott, supra note 98, at 301 (noting that "[n]ature notoriously appears indiffer-'
ent to individual life and/or individual suffering"); Sagoff, Animal Liberationand Environmental
Ethics: Bad Marriage, Quick Divorce, 22 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 297, 299 (1984) (stating that
"[n]ature ruthlessly limits animal populations by doing violence to virtually every individual
before it reaches maturity"). John Stuart Mill observed:
Nature impales men, breaks them as if on the wheel, casts them to be devoured by wild
beasts, burns them to death, crushes them with stones like the first Christian martyr, starves
them with hunger, freezes them with cold, poisons them by the quick or slow venom of her
exhalations and has hundreds of hideous deaths in reserve, such as the ingenious cruelty of a
Nabis or a Domitian never surpassed.
J. MILL, NATURE (1950), quoted in H. ROLSTON, supra note 52, at 39.
134. Humans may have an obvious self-interest in preventing undue water pollution. When
human interest is absent, however, concern for the river itself is arguably contrary to the natural
state of things. Other natural entities, such as animals, unhesitatingly pollute the river with excrement or other debris.
135. See Weiss, supra note 99, at 499 n.14.
136. See Stone, supra note 103, at 455 (noting that "each time there is a movement to confer
rights onto some new 'entity,' the proposal is bound to sound odd or frightening or laughable").
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interest in the natural environment. " Nature's influence on people
may be felt in a myriad of ways, but legislation is not among them.
Inasmuch.as the question is phrased in public policy terms, the answer
1 3s8
must come from humans alone.
Indeed, the terminology from a discussion of natural resources
seems antithetical to intrinsic valuation. The term "resource" implies
usefulness to man. 3 9 Similarly, "value" may require a human subject to
express a preference regarding the natural object. 40 Remove the human
subject, and the concept of value loses meaning.' The legal valuation
of natural resources is a human undertaking that is limited inescapably
to human understanding and choice.
Of course, one may be persuaded that nature has intrinsic value for
which government should account. Enlightened human preference thus
may capture at least a portion of intrinsic value, but the preference is
predicated necessarily on an informed human understanding of intrinsic value, not on the value itself."4 2 This recognition also helps defeat
the antidemocratic and elitist features potentially existing in concepts
43
of intrinsic value.1
Therefore, one must rely on Rabelais's description of man as "an
animate being born for pacific domination over all the beasts.' 4 4 Man's
domination is a positive fact, yet society should acknowledge a normative duty to be pacific and not to be needlessly destructive toward nature. This conclusion may obscure the difference between intrinsic and
existence value, but perhaps this result is unavoidable." 5 Moreover, for
the purpose of monetizing natural resource damages, drawing precise
137. The National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1982), for example, includes many phrases relating to human needs, such as "the overall welfare and development of
man." Id.; Tribe, supra note 108, at 1341 n.122.
f38. See Callicott, supra note 98, at 305 (stating that "intrinsic value ultimately depends
upon human valuers").
139. See, e.g., D. EHRENFELD, supra note 7, at 178.
140. See Brown, The Concept of Value in Resource Allocation, 60 LAND ECON. 231 (1984);
Callicot, supra note 98, at 305.
141. Brown, supra note 140, at 233.
142. See Elder, supra note 116, at 285 n.4 (1984). Elder observes that "[w]hether or not nonhumans have rights, only humans can be actors in the legal system and it must follow that only
human concerns could ever be addressed by it." Id. at 291. Rolston goes even further. He suggests
that by their nature values are "mental and ideal" and found "only in people." H. ROLSTON, supra
note 52, at 74. Consequently, natural things may be "carriers of value" identified by humans but
are not values in and of themselves. Id. at 75.
143. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
144. F. RABELAIS, THE HISTORIES OF GARGAN rUA AND PANTAGRUEL 308 (J. Cohen trans. 1986).
145. The concept of value may imply human preference. See Vanderpool, Social Action, Total Economic Value, and Environmental Policy: The Problem of Rationality, 116 TRANSACTIONS
AM. FISHERIES Soc'Y 336, 336 (1987) (suggesting that "individual preferences are the fundamental
source of value").
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lines between value types is less important than capturing the full import of those values.
D. Achieving a True Valuation of Natural Resources
The above categorization of values illuminates the breadth and
complexity of nature's worth. Natural resources may possess all of the
values above, each of which has some merit as a measure of the worth
of a given resource. None of these value conceptions is without shortcomings, however. Fortunately, the three value types are not exclusive.
Use value, existence value, and intrinsic value are analytically complementary. Insofar as the measurement of each value type can be isolated
effectively, the resulting damage figures contain no duplication. Perhaps
the true value of a given object is the additive total of its use, existence,
14 6
and intrinsic values.
Serious problems prevent the achievement of this true valuation.
There is no consensus over the legitimacy of considering intrinsic, or
even existence, value in measuring natural resource damages. Moreover,
while the Author is inclined to acknowledge some existence and intrinsic values in nature, merely recognizing a value type is useless for the
purposes of valuation absent a method for quantifying its magnitude in
dollars. The following section describes established methods of
quantification.
IV.

METHODS FOR MONETIZING DAMAGE TO NATURAL RESOURCES

Economists have developed several divergent methods for monetizing injuries to natural resources. Although no procedure is accepted
universally as a perfect methodology, all of these methods have some
merit and promise for measuring the monetary value of natural resources. 147 The four leading procedures for valuing natural resource
damages are: (a) restoration and replacement costs, (b) market valuation, (c) behavioral use valuation, and (d) contingent valuation. This
section summarizes the various methodologies, reviews the capabilities
146. Even the Department of the Interior, which rejects use of existence and intrinsic values
in its natural resource damage assessment regulations, "agrees that, in principle, option and existence values may exist for natural resources and that these would be additive to use values." 52
Fed. Reg. 9042, 9083 (1987) (Type A damage assessment procedures); see also 51 Fed. Reg. 27,719
(1986) (stating that "[o]rdinarily, option and existence values would be added to use values")
(Type B damage assessment rule).
147. All the valuation techniques discussed here should improve with further study. At the
present time, "valuation of environmental amenities" is a "major preoccupation of environmental
economists," in part because of renewed emphasis on cost-benefit analysis. Smith, Introduction to
Part I, in 3 APPLIED MICRO-EcONOMICS, supra note 70, at 3. Increased need for valuation under
Superfund and other damage recovery authorities should create an even greater incentive to study
and enhance valuation methodologies.
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and deficiencies of the primary methods proposed, and considers their
use in practice.
A.

Restoration and Replacement Cost

When natural resources are damaged, one obvious policy option is
to restore or replace them. When possible, restoration can be done on
the site where the resources were harmed. When on-site restoration is
impossible, the state may choose to acquire and protect comparable
land elsewhere, where natural resource values are roughly comparable
to those on the damaged site. When restoration is effective, the remedy
at least partially can cure the injuries to use value (by providing repaired resources for recreational use), existence value (by restoring the
existence of any destroyed resources), and intrinsic value (by reproducing intrinsically valuable natural resources). If a state were to select this
option, then the correct measure of natural resource damages would be
the cost of their restoration or replacement.
Strictly speaking, restoration and replacement are not means of
valuing natural resources. Restoration or replacement occurs regardless
of the value of the resources. Some people argue that certain resources
may not be worth the cost of their restoration. Automatic use of restoration cost values resources at infinity by ignoring this cost-benefit
equation. 148 Restoration cost, therefore, circumvents the question of resource valuation. Nevertheless, restoration cost is widely regarded as
one appropriate measure of natural resource damages and was the presumptive measure of damages under the original Clean Water Act. Furthermore, restoration cost often is easily determinable because
provide price information for many flora
biological supply firms already
149
resources.
natural
and fauna
While restoration cost seems simple to apply, several practical
questions about the procedure remain unanswered. The baseline to
which resources are to be restored must be settled. The state might require the polluter to restore nature to the conditions prevailing immediately before the damage causing release, or to a rough approximation of
148. See NOAA REPORT, supra note 80, at 48 (arguing that "the problem of using replacement cost as a measure of the lost welfare is that it reflects only the supply side of natural resource
uses. Since the value of any commodity is determined by the interaction of demand and supply,
the replacement cost method is deficient by definition"); W. DESVOUSGES & V. SKAHAN, supra note
94, at 2-43 (stating that a "basic objection to replacement cost is that it is an arbitrary valuation of
natural resources that may bear little relationship to true social values"); Yang, supra note 125, at
10,314 (discussing the distinction between cost and value).
149. W. DEsvousGEs & V. SKAHEN, supra note 94, at 2-43. While actually restoring a site
often may be quite expensive, the determination of damages is relatively simple and inexpensive
under the restoration cost procedure. See NOAA REPORT, supra note 80, at 38.

19891

NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE

a priori conditions. 150 The state also might require that restoration go
beyond the original, possibly polluted, conditions to create as natural
an environment as possible. 15 1 The procedures for restoration also are
debatable. Can trees be restored by planting seeds or should the government find and replant grown trees? To what degree should restoration plans account for the environment's own natural tendency to
restore itself over time?
Even if one can answer these questions in theory, ecologists dispute
the practicality of restoration. Because wildlife systematics and ecology
is a complex science, government may be unable to reproduce preexisting environmental conditions. Destruction of an ecosystem may be
"equivalent to removing the results of an ecological succession that represents in many cases centuries of natural processes."' 152 When prospects are promising, it may take several generations for the ecosystem
to resemble superficially its original condition, while in other circumstances complete restoration may be altogether impossible. 1 53 Serious
environmental damage may be irreversible; restoration would be a futile
remedy that might exacerbate the environmental damage that it is intended to correct. 154 Restoration ecology is still a relatively new sci150. See Comments of the Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n, supra note 14, at 13. The Chemical Manufacturers Association has argued that the restoration baseline should be the use value of the preexisting land-government should not require restoration of resources that provided little or no
public use. Id.
151. See Note, Theories of State Recovery Under CERCLA for Injuries to the Environment,
24 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1101, 1108 (1984). This article states: "A related problem with the restoration standard is the difficulty of pinpointing the 'health' of the pre-pollution environment. The
affected area may already have been degraded by previous pollution ... " Id.
152. J. KRUTILLA & A. FISHER, THE ECONOMICS OF NATURAL ENVIRONMENTS 43-44 (1975).
153. Id. at 44. At present, "[a]ctual cases of totally rebuilt ecosystems are still rare and will
remain so." D. EHRENFELD, supra note 7, at 187; see also Wood, Requiring Polluters to Pay for
Aquatic Natural Resources Destroyed by Oil Pollution, 8 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 545, 598 (1976).
Wood states:
The technology available to remove oil and to restock plant and animal communities is very
limited at present, and development of such a technology would be a long-range undertaking
*

... In most instances, the recovery of an ecosystem after an oil spill would occur, if at all,

only through the slow processes of natural regeneration.
Id. Between 1983 and 1985 the Kesterson National Wildlife Refuge in California was contaminated
severely by agricultural run-off, resulting in many bird casualties. Notwithstanding the Interior
Department's cleanup and restoration efforts, a recent study expressed concern that "the Kesterson pond area may never be suitable for wildlife." GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WILDLIFE
MANAGEMENT: NATIONAL REFUGE CONTAMINATION IS DIFFICULT TO CONFIRM AND CLEAN UP

28 (July

1987). Even after two centuries of recovery, nature still may show the effects of man's traumatizing
action. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 751 n.8 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting
ecologist Aldo Leopold on the effects of farming on nature's balance).
154. See Rorslett, Some EcologicalImplications of FreshwaterSystems Restoration,in THE
BREAKDOWN AND RESTORATION OF EcOSYSTEMS 347 (M. Holdgate & M. Woodman eds. 1978) [hereinafter RESTORATION OF ECOSYSTEMS] (finding that attempts to restore a Scandinavian lake damaged by water pollution actually "make the conditions in the lake worse" because "the restoration
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ence, 155 however, and in many circumstances at least proximate
restoration is practicable. 156
Even to the extent that restoration is possible, some environmentalists question its value. Restoration of a destroyed environment is like
a reproduction of a destroyed Monet painting-the new product may be
beautiful and similar to the original, but it is still inauthentic and inadequate as a replacement.' 57 To some naturalists, the concept of restoring natural environments is a close cousin to planting plastic trees.'58
Current philosophies of restoration ecology, however, disclaim a desire
to replicate precisely prior ecosystems and find worth in re-establishing
a new, self-sustaining ecosystem, regardless of its similarity to the
original. 59
The greatest objection to restoration is probably the enormous cost
that the process sometimes entails. The cost of attempting restoration
can vastly exceed the true value of the resources being restored. 60 The
First Circuit Court of Appeals confronted this problem in Puerto Rico
v. S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, 61 in which a Puerto Rico statute authorized
natural resource damages resulting from an oil spill.

6

2

The district

plans are working against the ecosystem instead of with it").
155. See Aber & Jordan, Restoration Ecology: An Environmental Middle Ground, 35 BiOSCIENCE 399 (1985). Aber and Jordan believe that this science can contribute to humankind's
knowledge of ecosystems and argue that a "holistic approach to restoration" can give human activity "a positive effect on the landscape." Id.
156. See generally 1 & 2 ECOLOGY AND RECLAMATION OF DEVASTATED LAND (R. Hutnik & G.
Davis eds. 1969) (published papers on the effect of restoration experiments); RESTORATION OF EcoSYSTEMS, supra note 154. Indeed, restored land may be "better" than the original in the sense of
improved habitat for a variety of species. See Bradshaw, Humphries, Johnson & Roberts, The
Restoration of Vegetation on Derelict Land Produced by Industrial Activity, in RESTORATION OF
ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 154, at 273.
157. See J. KRUTILLA & A. FISHER, supra note 152, at 45. The two writers argue that "[e]ven
the most painstaking application of modern scientific-technological resources would provide replicas of the original that would satisfy the recreational interests of only the less discriminating clientele." Id.
158. See id. at 46. Studies have shown various "submarkets" of wilderness consumers, among
which are "purists" who object to any human efforts to restore natural environments. Id.
159. See, e.g., Johnson & Bradshaw, Ecological Principlesfor the Restoration of Disturbed
and Degraded Land, in 4 APPLIED BIOLOGY 149 (T. Coaker ed. 1979) (stating that the objective is
not "complete reinstatement of the original environment as it was before disturbance" but "restoration of a properly functioning soil/plant ecosystem"). These authors further note that effective
restoration of functioning ecosystems "is a considerable challenge, but the success of so many
schemes in so many different areas of the world indicates that it is a challenge that can be met
." Id. at 194.

160. NOAA REPORT, supra note 80, at 47; Yang, supra note 125, at 10,315.
161. 628 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1980). The Zoe Colocotroni was carrying oil in the Caribbean and
grounded on a reef outside Puerto Rico. To free the tanker the ship's captain ordered the release
of 1.5 million gallons of oil into the sea. This oil floated onto a beach, destroying mangrove forests
and indigenous wildlife, such as fish, shrimp, snails, crabs, and tiny invertebrate organisms. See id.
at 657-61.
162. See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 12, § 1131 (29) (1978) (authorizing the Commonwealth's recov-
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court granted over six million dollars in damages, using restoration cost
as the measure of damages.1 6 3 While affirming the use of restoration
costs in many instances, the circuit court limited restoration to instances in which a "reasonable and prudent sovereign or agency" would
authorize it."" The circuit court concluded that the six million dollar
restoration was "disproportionately expensive" and inappropriate for
use in valuing damages."6 5 One might expect a similar conclusion from a
suit brought by the State of Colorado, in which the State has alleged 1.8
billion dollars in restoration cost damages from soil and groundwater
contamination. 6 There is widespread recognition, even among environmentalists, that restoration is sometimes too expensive or ineffective to
serve as a remedy for harms done to natural resources.
Given these problems with the restoration remedy, the concept of
site replacement has obvious appeal. Rather than restore the damaged
site, a government simply may purchase a comparable site and transform it into a state park or wildlife preserve. This alternative was suggested by the court in Zoe Colocotroni,167 and adopted by the court in
United States v. Board of Trustees of Florida Keys Community College.168 Confronted with evidence that restoration of the damaged site
had limited feasibility, the court ordered that a comparable environmental area be created from property already owned by the defendant
college.' 69 Although the polluter did not purchase a new site in this
case, the result embodies the concept of replacement as a remedy for
lost natural resources. In some circumstances, replacement may best
17 0
fulfill the objectives of Superfund.
ery of "damages caused to the environment and/or natural resources").
163. Puerto Rico v. S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, 456 F. Supp. 1327 (D.P.R. 1978). The court reached
this figure by obtaining estimates for the costs of replanting damaged mangrove trees and purchasing replacement animals for those destroyed. The latter damages included six cents for each of the
thousands of small invertebrate organisms killed by the oil spill. Id. at 1344-45.
164. Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d at 675.
165. Id. at 675-77.
166. See Note, supra note 41, at 222 (noting that "[i]t is highly unlikely that the plaintiffs
will be able to demonstrate over a billion dollars worth of value in the soil and groundwater of the
Rocky Mountain Arsenal"). The district court hearing the case, however, denied a motion to strike
the alleged damages. United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1085 (D. Colo. 1985).
167. Zoe Colocotroni,628 F.2d at 676 (stating that "[a]lternatives might include acquisition
of comparable lands for public parks or, as suggested by defendants below, reforestation of a similar proximate site").
168. 531 F. Supp. 267 (S.D. Fla. 1981). In this case the college had constructed an erosion
barrier of rocks that necessitated filling a natural slough. This process destroyed a small (one-half
acre) habitat for bottom vegetation used by developing fish and wildlife. Id. at 269-72. The court
found this very small area to be "important to the Florida Keys as a whole." Id. at 272.
169. Id. at 275.
170. See Note, supra note 151, at 1115 (stating that "[s]tate citizens may well derive greater
benefit from a newly-created public park than from a lengthy process of restoration of an area that
provided dubious benefit in the first place").
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Replacement has appeal as an easily measured and effective remedy, but the concept has serious limitations that may prevent its widespread application. When a polluter destroys unique resources,
replacement is an incomplete solution. Even when resources can be replaced perfectly, the concept of replacement disregards the possibility
that both the destroyed resources and the newly acquired replacement
resources should be protected and preserved. Because the two sets of
resources are not exclusive, the replacement remedy seemingly licenses
the destruction of natural resources as long as comparable resources exist elsewhere. As a consequence, the replacement remedy may restore
lost use value (by providing persons with a comparable recreational outlet), but fails to remedy the lost existence and intrinsic value of destroyed natural resources.
Thus, the available methods of restoration and site replacement
have shortcomings as methods for valuating natural resources. Nevertheless, these remedial options do have attractive features, and many
analysts regard them as the optimal response to natural resource damages under Superfund. The basis for this view is discussed in detail in
the subsection B of Part V.
B. Market Valuation
A readily available and appealing approach to valuing natural resources uses existing free market value as the measure of damages. In
1 71
an economic sense, value and market price are virtually congruent.
Market transactions demonstrate human value preferences through revealed behavior. For at least some natural resources, a court can determine value by consulting a price list. For example, commercial
hatcheries provide an established price for certain species of fish. Even
if no market exists for a resource, a court can measure damages by the
reduction in land value from the loss of the resource. Courts commonly
use this approach for measuring damages on privately held real estate.172 Diminution in property value following the destruction of natural resources yields the free market's evaluation of the economic harm
caused by a hazardous substance release. When such a release harms
the production of goods or services, lost profits are a market value measure of damages. Industry argues strongly for the use of market value in
monetizing damages to natural resources.
171. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 140, at 239 (noting that "neoclassical economists equate
value with competitive market price").
172. See W. DEsvousoEs & V. SKAHEN, supra note 94, at 2-8. The Interagency Land Acquisition Conference has developed procedures for valuing public lands that could be used under
Superfund. Id.
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Market valuation is easy to measure and promotes economic efficiency.17 1 In part for these reasons, loss of property value is customarily
the common-law measurement for damages to private natural resources.17 4 For injuries to animals, damages have been set historically at
the animal's market value. 765 Common-law decisions addressing damage
to productive trees customarily use diminution in land value as the
measure of damages.17 6 Market value was used recently when the State
of Washington sought recovery under parens patriae for damages to a
77
public salmon fishery.
Market valuation also carries special indicia of reliability. Unlike
other approaches in which survey takers ask individuals for their hypothetical valuation of natural resources, the market considers only those
who put their money where their mouth is. 175 The market measures
changes in the availability of natural resources and the corresponding
changes in the actions of individuals. The resulting economic effects are
directly observable and measurable. In addition, subsequent marketplace transactions constantly test and validate given values. The ability
to verify valuations, a behavioral attribute, makes the market especially
79
reliable.1
173. See, e.g., Fedkiw, supra note 66, at 347 (noting that "[m]arket values constitute the
single largest and most widely used information resource or data base in our society"); id. at 350
(stating that "[m]arket valuation will produce an abundant data base that will permit more useful
economic analysis"). But see Glass & Muth, supra note 84, at 384 (declaring that "price information is available for only a few kinds of fishery-related activities, such as commercial fishing and,
even in these cases, data are often inadequate").
174. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929(1)(a) (1977) (traditional rule uses diminution of property value as measure of damages). An exception exists when restoring the property
would cost less than the lost property value, in which case restoration cost is the measure of damages. See, e.g., Big Rock Mountain Corp. v. Stearns-Roger Corp., 388 F.2d 165, 168-69 (8th Cir.
1968).
175. See, e.g., Arkansas Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130 U.S. 69, 79 (1889). See generally C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 165 (1935).
176. See generally Annotation, Measure of Damages for Destruction of or Injury to Fruit,
Nut, or Other Productive Trees, 90 A.L.R.3d 800 (1979).
177. See State Dep't of Fisheries v. Gillette, 27 Wash. App. 815, 823, 621 P.2d 764, 768
(1980) (upholding the measure of damages based partly on "the market value of the fish" adjusted
for other public benefits).
178. See, e.g., Fedkiw, supra note 66, at 350.
179. See Brown, supra note 140, at 239. Other virtues of market price based valuation are
reviewed by Brown:
Competitive market price has four useful features from the standpoint of public decisionmaking. First, prices exist for many goods, putting those goods on an approximately comparable basis. Second, price is a social phenomenon, resulting from exchanges involving many
individuals. Third, it incorporates scarcity into the expression of value; that is, it results from
individual supply and demand that are expressed by actions (not mere words), which in turn
are constrained by real-world scarcity. Fourth, it gives the relative value of a small change in
total supply.
Id.
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Reliance on market valuation also contributes to economic efficiency. Efficiency is valuable because it should increase the welfare of
all members of society.18 0 Market price values equally both public resources and private. resources. If private resources are valued by a market price, but comparable public resources receive a different valuation,
then economic activities may be distorted. For example, if public trees
were valued more highly than privately owned trees, the result would be
to realign private behavior to increase the destruction of private natural
resources, rather than those held by the public trust. An efficient market avoids this unintended incidental result. Similarly, the free market
values industries more accurately by taking into account all externalities. For example, if the external social costs of a business or activity
are all included in damages through some "market value" plus methodology, but the external social benefits of the activity are ignored, then
the economic and social cost-benefit equation will be skewed unfairly
against the business or activity."8 " Consistent reliance on free markets
avoids such an outcome. Thus, one commentator contends that "market
valuation under free market conditions contributes to both the national
efficiency and to individual, and, in 8 a2 limited way, to social equity
objectives of our democratic society.'

Market valuation has obvious appeal for appraising the worth of
natural resources. The market value procedure has been demonstrated
to be practical, and maintains consistency between the valuation of pri180.

See Fedkiw, supra note 66, at 348 (stating that "[u]nder competitive conditions, market

valuation leads to maximizing net national welfare"). This concept typically goes by the name of
"Pareto optimality." In a Pareto optimal economic equilibrium, it is impossible to improve the
conditions of one person without consequently injuring the conditions of another person. Because
this equilibrium is not and may never be present, the concept is used typically as a test for policy
changes. If the overall benefits of a policy exceed its overall costs, that policy offers "potential
Pareto improvement." Economists often consider reliance on private markets and economic efficiency to offer potential Pareto improvement, moving our economy in the direction of optimality
and thereby improving the welfare of society as a whole. The use of economic efficiency in natural
resource valuation under Superfund is supported in Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at
1569-73. Other economists, however, criticize reliance on Pareto optimality or efficiency in public
policy decisionmaking. See, e.g., C. COOPER, supra note 78, at 46 (observing that imperfect information may cause efficiency concerns to produce "environmentally dangerous policies"); Randall,
Valuation in a Policy Context, in NATURAL RESOURcE ECONOMICS, supra note 83, at 170-75 (noting
that efficiency takes no account of ethical considerations). For these economists, reliance on potential Pareto improvement is even more questionable. See, e.g., Randall, supra note 100, at 331 (noting that, unlike the market, the concept of potential Pareto improvement does not allow for
voluntary exchange or actual compensation of those injured by a policy change).
181. This skewing is a problem with the traditional environmentalist demand for "internalization" of negative externalities associated with a business. While the goal is sensible, it ignores
the possibility that a business may create positive externalities (through employment, for example), which are likely to be ignored by law and economics. Internalization of externalities, therefore, does not necessarily yield greater economic efficiency.
182. Fedkiw, supra note 66, at 348.
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vate and public natural resources. As long as the United States has a
capitalist market economy, courts may prefer market valuation. This
preference is a presumption at best, however, and market valuation
may be inapplicable to public natural resources for a number of
reasons.
For some naturalists, particularly those who find some intrinsic
value in nature, complete reliance on market valuation is illegitimate or
even immoral. A remarkable historic example illustrates this point well.
Certain rare butterflies lived only in isolated corners of Africa. Reportedly, unscrupulous collectors would collect a few specimens and then
burn the surrounding grassland to destroy as many others of the species
as possible, thereby enhancing the uncommonness of their own collections and increasing their value. 8 ' Thus the free market created a direct incentive to destroy an endangered species. This natural response
to market incentives obviously is contrary to the goals of applicable environmental legislation and illustrative of the shortcomings of market
valuation. 8" Senator Max Baucus of Montana, a critic of market valuation, has observed that it "is inconceivable that any reasonable person
would suggest measuring the [value of the] Grand Canyon or Yellowstone Park on the basis of a land appraisal."' 8
Common-law precedents for private or public damages do not compel valuation based on the market. The common law does not use market value as the exclusive measure of private natural resource damages.
In many tort cases, for example, a court is more likely to use the cost of
restoration or repair as a measure of damages. 8 6 In circumstances when
property is peculiarly valuable to the owner, the owner may recover
costs greater than the loss of market value. 8 7 For example, the aes183. See H. ROLSTON, supra note 52, at 21.
184. See Yuhnke, The Importance of Visibility Protection in the National Parks and Wilderness, in MANAGING Am QuALrrY, supra note 82, at 297. Yuhnke described grand vistas as
"places where Americans can touch the past and feel a part of the land as God created it and feel
communion with the Creator Himself. Such values cannot be measured in the marketplace." Id.
185. 132 CONG. REc. S14,931 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Baucus).
186. See Board of Educ. v. Kentucky Dept. of Highways, 528 S.W.2d 657, 659 (Ky. 1975).
The Supreme Court has cautioned against making a "fetish" of market value, "since that may not
be the best measure of value in some cases." United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332 (1949) (involving "just compensation" valuation of a ship taken by the government).
187. See, e.g., United States v. Certain Land in Borough of Brooklyn, 346 F.2d 690, 694 (2d
Cir. 1965) (stating that the market value test should be abandoned "when the nature of the property or its uses produce a wide discrepancy between the value of the property to the owner and the
price at which it could be sold to anyone else"); Maloof v. United States, 242 F. Supp. 175, 184 (D.
Md. 1965) (quoting the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 929 comment b (1939), "where a building such as
a homestead is used for a purpose personal to the owner, the damages ordinarily include an
amount for repairs, even though this might be greater than the entire value of the building");
Regal Constr. Co. v. West Lanham Hills Citizen's Ass'n, 256 Md. 302, 305, 260 A.2d 82, 84 (1970)
(stating that "the measure of damages is the cost of restoration, even though this may be greater
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thetic value of trees may justify an award in excess of lost market
value."' 8 Analogously, market value may not be an adequate basis for
compensation when property is unique or seldom traded. 8 9 Damage to
public natural resources may fall within those categories in which market value is an inappropriate test of value.
Courts have addressed these issues most directly when valuing
public property taken by the eminent domain authority of another public entity. Typically, these courts look beyond market value and grant
restoration or replacement costs. On some occasions, courts have rejected market value because public facilities generally are not bought
and sold on the open market. 90 Courts also reject market value when
government has a duty to provide the services found on the land to be
taken. In these cases, paying the costs of restoration or replacement
may be necessary to preserve government functions. Even if the land
has some identifiable market value, damages to public property may be
measured by the amount necessary "in order to restore the public
agency to its prior state of efficiency in discharging its public functions."'9 1 When a government may have both a statutory responsibility
than the entire value of the property"); City of San Antonio v. The Congregation of Sisters of
Charity of the Incarnate Word, Inc., 404 S.W.2d 333, 337 (Tex. Ct. App. 1966) (declaring that a
plaintiff is not "limited to a recovery under the market value test if the evidence shows that such
test will not adequately compensate the owner for special damages suffered").
188. See, e.g., Farny v. Bestfield Builders, 391 A.2d 212, 214 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978); Barker v.
Publishers Paper Co., 78 N.H. 571, 574, 103 A. 757, 759 (1918) (stating that "for cutting and carrying away shade trees, the owner is not limited to their value for lumber" but may recover "what
their aesthetic value was"); Huber v. Serpico, 71 N.J. Super. 329, 345, 176 A.2d 805, 813 (App. Div.
1962) (declaring that "[s]ound principle and persuasive authority support the allowance to an aggrieved landowner of the fair cost of restoring his land to a reasonable approximation of its former
condition, without necessary limitation to the diminution in the market value of the land, where a
trespasser has destroyed shade or ornamental trees or shrubbery having peculiar value to the
owner").
189. County of Suffolk v. C.J. Van Bourgondien, Inc., 47 N.Y.2d 507, 511, 392 N.E.2d 1236,
1238, 419 N.Y.S.2d 52, 54 (1979).
190. See, e.g., United States v. Certain Property in Borough of Manhattan, 403 F.2d 800,
802-03 (2d Cir. 1968); see also County of Cook v. City of Chicago, 84 IM. App. 2d 301, 306, 228
N.E.2d 183, 186 (1967) (stating that school property in question "has no market value in a legal
sense" (citation omitted)); New Jersey State Highway Comm'r v. Board of Educ., 116 N.J. Super.
305, 319, 282 A.2d 71, 78 (Law Div. 1971) (stating that "when school property is condemned it is
not possible to determine fair market value because there are no comparable sales"); City of Tulsa
v. Mingo School Dist. No. 16, 559 P.2d 487, 493 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976) (concluding that "[b]ecause
of its unique nature, such [public] property is rarely sold in the open market"); Pennsylvania Gas
& Water Co. v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 428 Pa. 74, 83, 236 A.2d 112, 117 (1967) (declaring that "there simply does not exist a market, in the classic sense, for reservoir property"); Salt
Lake City Corp. v. Utah Wool Pulling Co., 566 P.2d 1240, 1242 (Utah 1977) (stating that "there
were no sales on the open market of water or water rights in the aquifer basin in which defendant's
property was located, and thus no market value in the usual sense of the term").
191. New Jersey State Highway Comm'r, 116 N.J. Super. at 319, 282 A.2d at 78; see also
Certain Property in Borough of Manhattan,403 F.2d at 804 (use restoration or replacement cost
when "the structure is reasonably necessary for the public welfare"); County of Cook, 228 N.E.2d
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under legislation such as the Wilderness Act and a public welfare concern in preserving natural resources (as recognized in the parens patriae cases), 92 restoration or replacement cost may be the appropriate
measure of damages at common law.
Market valuation may not reflect the true value of damaged public
natural resources. Sometimes, market value may overstate the real level
of damage. When substitute renewable resources are readily available,
the market price of the destroyed natural resource may be greater than
the true societal loss. 193 Market price also includes the cost of hunting
or otherwise harvesting resources, which should be deducted from market price before estimating the social loss from resource destruction.'
More commonly, however, market valuation will understate the true societal loss from damages to natural resources. Only about five percent
of some resources, such as plants and animals, possess an established
economic value. 9 5 When a surrogate market does exist, such as commercial fishing, the resultant values may represent incompletely the
value of resources to the overall public. 96 For example, the presence of
fish may have greater utility to recreational sports anglers than to commercial fishermen operating in the market.'97 In addition, the value of
at 187 (use replacement cost for public school property); Mingo School Dist. No. 16, 559 P.2d at
494-95 (use replacement cost for public school property); Texas v. Waco Indep. School Dist., 364
S.W.2d 263, 266 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963) (noting that "proper measure of damages is what is reasonably necessary to restore the ... land and facilities to the same or reasonably equal utility for high
school purposes").
192. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
193. See NOAA REPORT, supra note 80, at 27-28. The Report states:
Economic theory further postulates that, given the existence of opportunity cost, when existing employment disappears, inputs will move toward new employment opportunities. Then,
from a national perspective, a redistribution of expenditure cannot be construed as loss since
the inputs logically will follow the emergence of the demand elsewhere. For example, when
beach A is polluted the tourists may move to beach B in a neighboring state, redistributing
their expenditures from businesses near beach A to the ones near beach B. If the now idle
inputs at beach A will move to beach B to absorb the rise in demand, there should be no
social loss.
Id.
194. See, e.g., Carr v. United States, 136 F. Supp. 527 (E.D. Va. 1955) (stating that the damage of oyster kill to oyster farms must be reduced by the cost of "tonging" and marketing the
oysters); see also Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1571-72 (arguing that "[c]ourts
should take care to distinguish between the market value of resources in the wild and the market
value of the 'harvested' good").
195. See A. LEOPOLD, supra note 9, at 229. Leopold suggests that the market "tends to ignore, and thus eventually to eliminate, many elements in the land community that lack commercial value but that are (as far as we know) essential to its healthy functioning." Id.; see also Note,
supra note 151, at 1112 (stating that "[r]elatively few resources are commercially exploited").
196. Randall, supra note 100, at 326.
197. For example, long-term contracts or a buyers' market can prevent resource damages
from affecting the price of real estate. NOAA REPORT, supranote 80, at 41. Alternatively, the price
of land already may be discounted in expectation of a future hazardous substance release. Id.
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fish to commercial fishermen may substantially exceed their return in
their business. 19 8 Land prices may not reflect resource damages because
of market imperfections.19 Insofar as public land has different purposes
from privately held land, it may be unrealistic to expect costs or values
to be the same.200 Markets are simply unaccustomed to pricing nonexclusive goods, which theoretically may be "possessed" by all members
of a society simultaneously.
More significantly, market valuation fails to account for several
types of natural resource value. The market comes closest to approximating use value, but even there market valuation has shortcomings.
State ownership of natural resources may distort the free market and
the valuations it yields.201 There is no established market in bird watching, for example, and the market value of given birds may not reflect
even the use value of this recreational activity.2 0 2 The social value of the

famous Lone Cypress of Monterey Peninsula cannot be reduced to its
price as lumber. The lack of a functioning market in publicly held natural resources is a major impediment to reliance on market valuation.
Furthermore, even if an effective market existed for the public utilization of natural resources, the market would undervalue the true use
value of these resources. Market prices fail to include the consumer surplus from a transaction,20 3 which may represent a major component of
198. See id. at 44. Intuitively, the effect of a hazardous substance spill on land used by a
souvenir seller will be different from its effect on a wildlife preserve.
199. McConnell, Values of Marine RecreationalFishing: Measurement and Impact of Measurement, 61 Am.J. AGRiC. ECON. 921, 921 (1979); see also Smith, SatisfactionBonus from Salmon
Fishing: Implications for Economic Evaluation, 57 LAND ECON. 181, 189 (1981) (stating that
"[c]omparisons of commercial and recreational fishing value usually show angling is more
valuable").
200. See Glass & Muth, supra note 84, at 381 (stating that "commercial fishermen capture a
return beyond that which is reflected in net revenues because they gain the satisfactions of participation itself"); Smith, supra note 199, at 188 (declaring that the "pleasure factor stimulates additional fishing effort despite negative economic returns"); id. at 190 (majority of salmon fishermen
had "gross returns less than 'out of pocket' costs" yet remain in business).
201. Although some parks charge entrance fees, typically they are not motivated by a desire
to maximize profits. See supra notes 207-09. As a consequence, private parks may be unable to
compete with those run by the government, and a market for recreational use of wildlife has never
developed fully.
202. It would be disingenuous to suggest that the market value of eagles, if one even exists,
captures the value of those animals to naturalists. Nor can the value of a tree be reduced to its
worth as marketable timber. See Leepers, Norbury & Kaiser, Multiple-Use Resource Economics:
Theory and PlanningApplications, 116 TRANSAcTIONs AM. FISHERiEs Soc'Y 367, 367 (1987) (stating that "[florest lands provide a wide variety of social benefits such as recreation, aesthetics, and
wildlife in addition to the traditional benefits attributed to timber").
203. See Developments in the Law, supra note 11, at 1571 n.37. In the optimal operation of
the free market, prices are set at the level at which the marginal buyer is willing to pay and the
marginal seller is willing to sell. As a consequence, some buyers will be able to purchase a good for
less than they would be willing to pay. The difference between the sale price and the price that the
consumer would have been willing to pay is known as the consumer surplus. This difference repre-
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use value. 20 " Nor can market value encompass positive externalities 2of
05
public resources, such as contributions to the local private economy.

Market valuation fails almost completely to capture the existence value
and intrinsic value of damaged natural resources.20 6 Such incompleteness does not yield even the free market goal of fully internalizing an
external cost.
C. Behavioral Use Valuation
Theoretically, public natural resources could be valued through the
market if government established realistic user fees for these resources.
Indeed, policy analysts have made strong arguments for greater use of
these fees, 07 but this option has been largely rejected in favor of
noneconomic values.208 Nor are our public parks and other resources
managed with an eye to market prices or maximizing profit.209 In short,
sents a clear benefit to some purchasers that presumably should be considered when valuing resources. But see Fedkiw, supra note 66, at 348-49 (criticizing use of consumer surplus measures for
natural resource damages).
204. See W. DESVOUSGES & V. SKAHEN,supra note 94, at 2-6 (indicating that consumer sur-

plus may be more significant for typical public goods than for ordinary privately marketed
products).
205. See, e.g., Usher, Ontario Lake of the Woods Fishery: Economic and Social Analysis,
116 TRANSACTIONS Am.FISHERIES Soc'y 352, 358 (1987) (stating that Ontario receives millions of

dollars of benefit from recreational fishing).
206. This point could be argued. On occasion, conservation organizations have raised funds
to purchase land in order to prevent development. When this occurs, the existence value of some
individuals becomes reflected in the market for property. See 1984 COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY, ANNUAL REPORT: ENVIRONMENTAL QuALiTY 363-429 (cataloguing numerous instances of

private conservation). It seems unlikely that this procedure succeeds in reflecting the existence
value of natural resources for most Americans, however.
207. See Bedi, Pricing of Recreational Fishing Access-A Discussion of Major Issues, with
Special Reference to Ontario, 116 TRANSACTIONS AM. FiSHERIES Soc'y 390, 390 (1987) (stating that
"It]here appears to be wide support within the public policy literature and among the public for
shifting the burden of service payments from general taxation onto beneficiaries of these
services").
208. As a practical matter, democratic political interest may preclude market pricing of recreational resources, as "existing access fees and charges are very difficult to raise, and new ones are
difficult to introduce." Id. at 390; see, e.g., Talhelm & Libby, supra note 93, at 294 (observing that
"[o]ne [Michigan] proposal to eliminate free fishing licenses for spouses of license holders was
rejected in order to encourage family fishing; family values were judged more important than additional revenue for better fishery management, although we had no analysis of the impact on family
values"). While free spouse licenses ultimately were abolished, the example noted by Talhelm and
Libby demonstrates public resistance to using a market for publicly held natural resources. But see
Fedkiw, supra note 66, at 347. Access fees have increased much faster than inflation in this decade,
however.
209. See Glass & Muth, supra note 84, at 381 (declaring that "[1]egislative policy and legal
constraints directing fishery management agencies have made it clear that the maximization of net
revenues in the short run is not the sole objective of public fisheries management. . . .public
agency fishery managers are usually mandated to consider long-run biophysical consequences to
the fish populations and socioeconomic distributional questions even if at a sacrifice to present
revenues"); Leefers, Norbury & Kaiser, supra note 202, at 369. The Leefers, Norbury, and Kaiser
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society forgoes economic efficiency in order to make available to a wider
range of people access to public natural resources. 210 This political fact
itself indicates that market value generally is inappropriate for public
natural resources.
Economists seeking to overcome the shortcomings of market valuation of public goods have developed new methods for valuing natural
resources based on human behavior, including travel cost studies and
hedonic valuation. These procedures primarily measure the use value of
natural resources by seeking market surrogates for unpriced natural
resources.
Since the 1940s, 2 11 travel cost valuation has used the travel expenses of visitors to monetize the worth of a given recreational site.
This procedure is based on the intuitive assumption that the value of a
site to visitors is reflected in the expense they incur to visit the site.
Travelers pay a price for recreation in terms of transportation expenses,
the opportunity cost of time lost, entrance fees, and other expenses of
traveling. 212 This method also measures incremental losses in natural
resources-as individual resources are destroyed, the site presumably
becomes less attractive to visitors and travel expenditures decline correspondingly. The travel cost methodology is now accepted by most economists" 3 and is probably the most common method for estimating
demand in a use valuation.2 14
Travel cost valuation has several appealing attributes. The procedure is based largely on verifiable human behavior and therefore seems
to be a reliable tool. Although some research is necessary, collection of
data on site visitation patterns should not be too onerous." 5 Because
economists already have done numerous travel cost studies for recreation sites,21 6 this background should help government trustees conduct
future appraisals of lost natural resources.
article stated that "[florest managers invest substantially in non-market outputs. Often policies
are followed that implicitly place a high value on these non-market outputs." Id.
210. Glass & Muth, supra note 84, at 383; see also Bedi, supra note 207, at 392 (arguing that
"[g]iven the magnitude of recreational catch and fishing effort in both Canada and the United
States, such low license fees represent nearly free access").
211. See Brown & Mendelsohn, The Hedonic Travel Cost Method, 66 Rev. Econ. & Statistics 427 (1984).
212. See W. DESVOUSGEs & V. SKAHEN, supra note 94, at 2-11.
213. Note, supra note 41, at 214; see also NOAA REPORT, supra note 80, at 51.
214. Allen, Stevens & Barrett, The Effects of Variable Omission in the Travel Cost Technique, 57 LAND ECON. 173, 173 (1981).
215. See NOAA REPORT, supra note 80, at 56; see also W. DESVOUSGES & V. SKAHEN, supra
note 94, at 2-11 (declaring that it is often "possible to use information collected for other
purposes").
216. W. DEsvousGEs & V. SKAHEN, supra note 94, at 2-16 to 2-20 (summarizing the procedures and results of 24 travel cost studies conducted since 1970).
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Travel cost valuation is subject to several criticisms, however.
While theoretically possible, the procedure may not be sensitive enough
in practice to measure the impact of relatively small changes on the
availability of natural resources.2 17 When other site changes coincide
with the pollution of natural resources, the procedure does not isolate
the effects of the natural resource harms. 18 People may visit the site
after destruction of natural resources to enjoy unaffected areas, thus
defeating the efforts of travel cost valuation to estimate economic
harms. 1 9 Visitors' lack of information or misperception of site quality
also may skew the results of travel cost valuation. 2 ° Courts may have
difficulty obtaining complete and accurate data. 221 Travel cost valuation
also ignores incidental use benefits from natural resources.2 22 Finally,
travel cost methods apply only when travel is a large part of the household expense.223
Another methodological difficulty associated with the travel cost
model is the problem of valuing travel time. People who forgo wage income during site visits may have considerable opportunity costs. The
significance of these opportunity costs, however, depends on the individual's wage rate and his ability to work during travel time. 22 Some
217. See id. at 2-13 (stating that "[e]stablishing linkages between the injured CERCLA resource and the travel cost model is probably the most difficult problem in using the approach for
valuing CERCLA resources"). New and creative procedures could help overcome this difficulty. A
hybrid of travel cost and contingent valuation has been proposed for the measurement of individual site characteristics. See Brown & Mendelsohn, supra note 211, at 427.
218. For example, suppose a park created new camping facilities at about the same time that
a hazardous substance release caused a fish kill. The full extent of user damage to natural resources would be obscured by the new benefits offered by the site.
219. For example, suppose a certain group of people annually visit Yellowstone National
Park to view bison, among other reasons. If the bison die, some of these people may still visit the
park to see Old Faithful geyser or other features. These visitors may lose utility from the loss of
bison, but the travel cost procedure fails to discern the loss, as long as the individuals visit the
same park for other purposes. The travel cost model tests the demand for the site as a whole, not
for individual resources.
220. See A. FREEMAN, THE BENEFITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMEN7. THEORY AND PRACTICE
219 (1979). If individuals are not informed of the damage to natural resources, then they may
revisit the site and be disappointed. Travel cost valuation only considers the fact of the visit,
however, not the subsequent loss of utility.
221. See Comments of the Edison Elec. Inst., the Util. Air Regulatory Group, the Util. Water
Act Group, and the Util. Solid Waste Activities Group on Proposed Rulemaking on Natural Resources Damage Assessment, at 62 (March 21, 1986) (source on file with Author) (noting that it is
"often difficult to obtain adequate input data" for travel cost valuation and that "much of the data
used to generate travel cost estimates (including the degree of use of a resource) may be imprecise
and out-of-date").
222. See Randall, supra note 100, at 329 (stating that "for example, scenery adds to the
enjoyment of travel undertaken for some entirely different purpose").
223. Anderson & Bishop, supra note 83, at 128.
224. Still other factors may affect the opportunity cost of travel. If individuals were not traveling to a recreational site, then they might substitute other leisure activities rather than work.
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policy analysts have suggested valuing recreational travel time at
twenty-five percent to fifty percent of an individual's wage rate as a
rough compromise.2 " Other analysts propose to use the full wage rate,
at least for persons who can adjust their hours worked.22 6 Neither approach enjoys a consensus among economists. 2 7 Another dispute has
arisen over whether the methodology requires individual data on travel
cost or if zonal aggregation may be used.22 8 Other measurement deficiencies in travel cost valuation also persist.229 Two authors have suggested that the travel cost method forces researchers "to perform
econometric acrobatics, apologize for omitted variables, and specify
'2 0
models that make tenuous assumptions about consumer behavior.
Indeed, the results of travel cost valuation may be unduly dependent on
certain technical judgments by researchers, which are necessarily
21
arbitrary.
Perhaps more significant than these methodological difficulties are
Time cost valuation for other family members can also be complex. See Bishop & Heberlein, Measuring Values of Extramarket Goods: Are Indirect Measures Biased?, 61 AM. J. AGRIC. EcoN. 926,
926 (1979).
225. See, e.g., Cesario, Value of Time in Recreation Benefit Studies, 52 LAND ECON. 32
(1976).
226. See Smith, Desvousges & McGivney, The Opportunity Cost of Travel Time in Recreation Demand Models, 59 LANm ECON. 259 (1983).
227. See McConnell, Comment 2, in NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMICS, supra note 83, at 151,
155, (suggesting that these problems are now irresolvable); see also Allen, Stevens & Barrett, supra
note 214, at 179. The authors state:
Previous studies have concluded that the travel cost procedure will underestimate recreational values if the effects of either travel time or congestion are omitted from the model We
have demonstrated, however, that the nature and extent of bias due to model misspecification
is likely to vary from situation to situation and that the selection of an appropriate specification is indeed a difficult task.
Id.
228. In zonal aggregation, economists survey travel costs from a particular area and average
them. See W. DESVOUSGES & V. SKAHEN, supra note 94, at 2-13.
229. Travel cost methods survey only current site users and overlook resource benefits to
those who have yet to travel to a site but expect to do so in the future. Travel cost valuation
underestimates the worth of sites where travel expenditures are minimal (when visitors are located
near the site). Alternatively, the method may overvalue sites if the availability of substitutes is not
accurately factored in. For a summary of these and other difficulties, see generally W. DEsvousGEs
& V. SKAHEN, supra note 94, at 2-13 to 2-15.
230. Anderson & Bishop, supra note 83, at 128 (stating that the method has improved over
time and "is likely to be acceptable to those who are involved in valuation techniques because of
its basic validity").
231. See Stynes & Donnelly, Simplifying the Travel Cost Method, 116 TRANSACTIONS AM.
FISHERIES Soc'Y 432, 432 (1987). Stynes and Donnelly note:
Researchers are finding, increasingly, that estimates of demand and value from travel cost
studies can be quite sensitive to a variety of technical decisions, such as aggregation of the
data, weighting of data points, functional form of the demand curve, statistical estimation
methods, definition of market boundaries, and omitted variables.
Id. (citations omitted).
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the inherent deficiencies in travel cost valuation. By its nature, travel
cost captures only the use value of natural resources and ignores the
possibility of existence or intrinsic values. Moreover, the procedure does
not reflect the preferences of poor or working persons, who lack the resources to travel. Travel cost also places low value on true wilderness
areas, where human visitation is actually discouraged.
Notwithstanding imperfections in travel cost valuation, the method
roughly approximates use value in at least some instances. 232 Travel
cost valuation probably is the best available measurement tool for use
value.2 33 To the extent that existence value or intrinsic value types are
important, however, travel cost methods may understate seriously the
true worth of natural resources.
Another market-oriented method of valuation is hedonic price valuation. Hedonic valuation measures the extent to which the value of a
nonmarketed commodity, such as a pristine environment, is captured
directly in the price of marketed commodities, such as land. The best
example of hedonic price valuation measures the value of air quality
changes by linking high levels of pollution to lowered housing prices or
wage rates.23 In this way, researchers can measure the value of clean air
by the willingness of homeowners to pay a premium to live in unpolluted areas. In some instances, such as the effect of air pollution on
property values in the Los Angeles area, hedonic price valuation appears to be a reliable measure and may be the "most widely accepted
empirical approach" to economic valuation of public goods. 3 5 Consequently, hedonic price measurement warrants consideration as a
method for valuing damage to natural resources.
Unfortunately, hedonic price valuation seldom will be helpful for
valuing typical natural resource damage. The best tool for hedonic pricing of environmental amenities is property values, but the lack of a
market for public resources limits the utility of this tool. For private
land, the environmental value of a site is difficult to isolate from its
other attributes, such as convenience to employment, school quality,
and innumerable other variables that may affect property values.23 6 The
232.

The measure will apply best, for example, where natural resource damages are severe

and affect significantly the appeal of the site.
233. NOAA REPORT, supra note 80, at 55.
234. See, e.g., A. FREEMAN, supra note 220, at 78; Anderson & Bishop, supra note 83, at 105.
For a detailed exposition of the economic theory of hedonic price valuation, see id. at 106-13.
235. Brookshire, Thayer, Schulze & d'Arge, Valuing Public Goods: A Comparisonof Survey
and Hedonic Approaches, 72 A. EcoN. REV. 165, 165 (1982).
236. One well-regarded hedonic property value study of air quality in Boston included the
following variables: The average number of rooms in the house, distance to five employment centers, accessibility to highways, property tax rate, pupil-teacher ratio in local schools, percentage of
blacks in local population, percentage of poor in local population, crime rate, size of lots, propor-
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237
hedonic valuation procedure also relies on questionable assumptions.
In addition, consumers may have difficulty adjusting their market preferences for marginal injuries to natural resources. Limited options or
transaction costs may prevent individuals from adjusting fully to natural resource damage.2 8 Hedonic price valuation also may be unable to
capture certain injuries, such as those to national parks. While many
Americans value national parks, damage to these resources will be reflected at best only in the property values of those few who live in or
near the parks. Even assuming that hedonic pricing works well for valuing air quality, the methodology holds little promise for valuing damage
to basic environmental goods such as water quality. 239 At present, hedonic pricing holds little promise for evaluating natural resource damages in most contexts. As new and creative methods are developed,
however, hedonic pricing and other measures of use value may better
capture the significant values of natural resources. 2 40 Even then, behavtion of nonretail business, and riverside location. See M. HUFSCHMIDT, D. JAMES, A. MEIsTER, B.
BOWER & J. DIXON, ENVIRONMENT, NATURAL SYsTEMs, AND DEVFELOPMENT 204 (1983) [hereinafter M.
HUFSCHMIDT] (reviewing the Harrison & Rubinfeld study). While this study represents an ambitious effort to isolate air quality from interfering variables, there are other factors in housing price
that could obscure the correct results.
237. See id. at 207 (listing such assumptions, which include the assumptions that "perfect
information on real estate prices exists," that "households continually reevaluate their locational
decisions," and that decisions are based on current environmental quality rather than "expectations about future environmental quality"). Another consideration is that the sometimes radical
changes in housing cost and shifting interest rates may make moving impractical for many families, even should they value environmental quality highly.
238. For example, how practical is it for a family to move its entire household in response to
nearby natural resource damage? Natural resource damage that is less than the cost of moving
(which may itself be quite substantial) will largely be ignored by hedonic pricing schemes. See, e.g.,
McConnell, supra note 227, at 158.
239. See M. HuFsCHMIDT, supra note 236, at 209. The authors state:
[T]he two reasons for such a dearth of applications in the water pollution field are limited
data and the fact that property value studies measure only those benefits that accrue to landowners adjacent to the improved body of water. For major bodies of water, however, this is
likely to represent only a relatively small portion of the total benefits ....
Id.; see also Fisher & Raucher, supra note 71, at 45 (stating that "[tihe main disadvantage of this
technique is that property values do not reflect benefits to users or non-users who do not own
property near the water"); Smith, supra note 147, in 3 APPLIED MIcRo-EcONOMICS, supra note 70,
at 6 (stating that "[o]ften indirect market methods, such as the hedonic property value model, are
not available").
240. One interesting study has used market measures to value wetlands in Massachusetts.
Gupta & Foster, Economic Criteria for Freshwater Wetland Policy in Massachusetts, 57 Ab. J.
AGRIC. ECON. 40 (1975). This study measured wildlife values based on wetland acquisition prices
paid by the state department of fish and game, visual-cultural values based on land purchases
made by town conservation commissions, water supply benefits based on the costs of alternative
water supplies, and flood control benefits based on Army Corps of Engineers data. Id. at 41-43.
The authors concluded that varying wetlands had benefits ranging from $700 per acre to nearly
$60,000 per acre. Id. at 44. Some obvious shortcomings remain in this study. It involves considerable subjectivity and the first two categories of measurement seem to include double-counting of
benefits. It also may be difficult to apply these principles to circumstances other than wetlands.
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ioral use valuation methods at best capture only a portion of use value
and ignore the other potential values of public natural resources.
D.

Contingent Valuation

Contingent valuation simplifies the process of valuing natural resources by asking people directly what monetary value they place on
identified resources: "How much are you willing to pay for preserving
the remaining grizzlies in Yellowstone National Park?2' 41 Although it is
impossible to survey every American, this method yields a value for
given natural resources through established survey techniques and averaging. Contingent valuation is a convenient, direct measure for assessing any particular type of natural resource damage, and because
researchers now have considerable experience using contingent valua-

tion, it is gaining credibility.242

Contingent valuation is controversial, however, because it is entirely hypothetical and because it assumes that people respond to the
survey as they would to a marketplace transaction.2 4 3 Empirical studies
suggest that people's expressed attitudes do not accurately predict their
actual behavior. 4 4 Economists are much more comfortable measuring
revealed preferences in genuine market sales. 4 5 Even an economist,
however, should recognize that expressed preferences sometimes may
Nevertheless, advances such as this in the science of valuation promise to lend additional accuracy
to our efforts to monetize natural resource losses.
241. This sample question is unrealistically simple for an effective contingent valuation survey. Accurate assessment requires more detailed questions and a series of follow up questions to
enhance the reliability of the results. See Smith, Desvousges & McGivney, supra note 226, at D-5
to D-13 (presenting a sample questionnaire for valuing changes in water quality of the Monongahela River).
242. See Bishop, Boyle & Welsh, supra note 95, at 343; W. DEsvousGEs & V. SKAHEN,supra
note 94, at 2-39 to 2-41 (listing and summarizing 23 contingent valuation studies).
243. Thus, many economists are reluctant to accept contingent valuation, on the theory that
"'[alsk a hypothetical question and you get a hypothetical answer.'" Anderson & Bishop, supra
note 83, at 125; see also Bishop, Boyle & Welsh, supra note 95, at 342 (stating that "[b]oth economists and noneconomists have questioned whether survey techniques can be used to ascertain
valid values"); Bishop & Heberlein, supra note 224, at 927 (declaring that "the hypothetical nature
of the transactions may not be at all indicative of how people would behave in an actual market");
Smith, supra note 147, in 3 APPLIED MI RO-EcoNoMIcs, supra note 70, at 6 (stating that "contingent valuation methods are viewed with skepticism by many (if not most) economists").
244. See, e.g., Ajzen & Fishbein, Attitude-Behavior Relations: A Theoretical Analysis and
Review of the Empirical Research, 84 PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 888, 888 (1977) (summarizing the data
and noting "the general consensus was that measures of attitude have little value for the prediction of overt behavior"). The authors suggest, however, that the lack of correspondence between
attitude and behavior may be attributable largely to flaws in the design of past empirical research
on the issue.
245. See, e.g., Smith, Desvousges & Fisher, A Comparison of Direct and Indirect Methods
for Estimating Environmental Benefits, 68 AM. J. AGRIc. EcoN. 280, 280 (1986).
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be more accurate than preferences revealed in the market.2 4
Researchers have raised more specific criticisms against contingent
valuation as a tool for natural resource appraisal. Most of these criticisms question whether individuals can or will reveal their true value
for resources in response to a.survey. Researchers fear that respondents
might tailor their answers to produce certain public policies, because
they would not be required to pay directly for preserving the natural
resources in issue. 24 7" For example, environmentalists might place a very

high value on preservation, even higher than their willingness to pay, in
order to promote preservationist policies. While concern over this strategic behavior bias is reasonable, the effect of this behavior appears to
be insignificant in actual practice. Studies testing for the presence of
strategic responses in contingent valuation have discovered that strategic responses are largely absent,24' at least when questionnaires are well

designed.249
246. See Brown, supra note 140, at 241 (containing persuasive example of this phenomenon).
Brown notes, "[a]n individual's held values may incorporate concern about air pollution, but, because the person realizes he or she has little power to effect a change in the use of the common
resource, his or her actions do not reflect such concern." Id.
247. For a summary of this concern, see A. FREEMAN, supra note 220, at 87-96.
248. One study was constructed to create an incentive for consumers to overstate or understate their true values for public goods, but the survey's results found that the incentives had no
significant effect. Bohm, Estimating Demand for Public Goods: An Experiment, 3 EUR.ECON. REV.
111 (1972). Another study found little difference between environmentalists and nonenvironmentalists in valuing natural resource damage and found few outlying, unusually high responses.
Brookshire, Ives & Schulze, The Valuation of Aesthetic Preferences, 3 J. ENvTL. ECON. & MGMT.
325 (1976); see also Schulze, d'Arge & Brookshire, Valuing Environmental Commodities: Some
Recent Experiments, 57 LAND ECON. 151 (1981). Even "[a]ttempts to find evidence of strategic
behavior in [contingent valuation] studies themselves have failed to find evidence of significant
distortions." Bishop, Heberlein & Kealy, Contingent Valuation of Environmental Assets: Comparisons with a Simulated Market, 23 NAT. RpsOURCES J. 619 (1983). A recent summary of the
literature concluded that "there is a body of psychological evidence to the effect that strategic
behavior is likely to be encountered only infrequently." Randall, Theoretical Bases for Non-Market Benefit Estimation, in VALUATION OF WILDLAND REsOURCE BENEFITs 77, 79 (G. Peterson & A.
Randall eds. 1984); see also Fisher & Raucher, supra note 71, in 3 APPLIED MIcRo-EcoNoMIcs,
supra note 70, at 46 (concluding that "most writers have found strategic bias to be small"); Hoehn,
Contingent Valuation in Fisheries Management: The Design of Satisfactory Contingent Valuation Formats, 116 TRANSACTIONS AM. FIsHERIEs Soc'y 412, 415 (1987) (reviewing the past studies
and noting that "[e]vidence of strategic effects in contingent valuation is unexpectedly weak").
249. Smith, Desvousges & McGivney, supra note 226, at 4-5 (suggesting that strategic bias
may be present in some instances but that the bias can be overcome by "effectively designed survey questionnaires"); see also Freeman, Approaches to MeasuringPublic Goods Demands, 61 AM.
J. AGRIC. ECON. 915, 916 (1979) (stating that "[i]t
appears to be possible, however, to design survey
questions so as to eliminate the incentives for biased response"); Hoehn, supra note 248, at 415
(noting that research "shows that it is possible to control the incentives for truth-telling through
appropriate design of the decision-making context"); Thayer, Contingent Valuation Techniques
for Assessing EnvironmentalImpacts: FurtherEvidence, 8 J. ENVTL.ECON. & MGMT. 27, 27 (1981)
(noting that "available evidence indicates that strategic behavior can be neutralized by sound
questionnaire design").
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Another criticism of contingent valuation challenges whether respondents have sufficient information to make an accurate valuation.2 5 0
Because people have little experience placing monetary value on unpriced natural resources, survey results may be hypothetical and inaccurate. Accuracy here is difficult to test, because resources have no
established true value against which contingent valuation may be measured.251 The results of contingent valuation can be compared with results from other valuation methods, however. The comparison shows
that the results of contingent valuation experiments are roughly consistent with the results of travel cost valuation 25 2 and hedonic property
valuation. 5 3 Even more significantly, studies have found that contingent valuation yields values similar to those in actual marketplace
transactions. 5 4 An elaborate EPA study of several contingent valuation
methods and travel cost analysis concluded that "the consistency in
these estimates should be interpreted as offering strong support for the
'255
feasibility of performing benefit analysis for water quality changes.
Perhaps the most compelling favorable evidence is the internal consis257
tency 256 and replicability of contingent valuation survey results.
250. See Bishop, Heberlein & Kealy, supra note 248, at 627-28; see also Gregory, supra note
92, at 378. Gregory asserts that "[a]sking for statements of value that are of a higher level of
precision than people readily can articulate will encourage the creation of experimental noise; such
measures of value might 'look good' but actually provide lower-quality information and, thus, mislead rather than inform resource managers and policymakers." Id. But see Fisher & Raucher,
supra note 71, in 3 APPLIED MICRO-EcONOMICS, supra note 70, at 46 (suggesting that such biases
may be overcome by well-conducted surveys).
251. See Randall, supra note 248, at 84 (noting that "the 'crucial experiment'--that is, one
which tests a refutable hypothesis to the effect that estimated values are (are not) equal to the real
values-is seldom permitted").
252. See Bishop, Boyle & Welsh, supra note 95, at 343 (survey noting that "where it was
possible to use more than one valuation technique, contingent values have turned out to be
roughly similar to alternative measures"); see also Bishop & Heberlein, supra note 224, at 926;
Duffield, Travel Cost and Contingent Valuation: A Comparative Analysis, in 3 APPLIED MICROECONOMICS, supra note 70, at 67; Knetsch & Davis, Comparisonof Methods for RecreationalEvaluation, in WATER RESEARCH 125 (A. Kneese & S. Smith eds. 1966); Sellar, Stoll & Chavas, Validation of Empirical Measures of Welfare Change: A Comparison of Nonmarket Techniques, 61
LAND EcoN. 156 (1985). Equally important, logic explains the differences that do exist between the
two study procedures. See Duffield, supra, in 3 APPLIED MICRo-EcoNOmIcs, supra note 70, at 83.
253. See Brookshire, Thayer, Schulze & d'Arge, Valuing Public Goods: A Comparison of
Survey and Hedonic Approaches,72 AM. ECON. REv. 165 (1982); Randall, Ives & Eastman, Bidding
Games for Valuation of Aesthetic Environmental Improvements, 1 J. ENVTL. EcoN. & MGMT. 132,
147 (1974).
254. See generally Bishop, Heberlein & Kealy, supra note 248. This study compared a contingent valuation questionnaire asking the value of goose hunting permits with actual sales of such
permits. Another study of deer hunting permits also supports the validity of contingent valuation.
Bishop, Boyle & Welsh, supra note 95, at 343. In addition, "[lI]aboratory experiments at the University of Wyoming also compared cash and contingent valuation and found close correspondence
for willingness to pay." Id. (citation omitted).
255. Smith, Desvousges & McGivney, supra note 226, at 8-20.
256. See Brookshire, Eubanks & Randall, Estimating Option Prices and Existence Values
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Notwithstanding the demonstrated reliability of contingent valuation, representatives of industry argue that the procedure remains uncertain and violates the common-law proscription against awarding
speculative damages.2 5s This contention misunderstands the established

legal rule. The rule precludes recovery only when the fact of damage,
not the amount of damage, is uncertain. 5 9 In the context of natural
resource damages, the damage is certain, and well-conducted contingent
valuation surveys should provide sufficient information to fulfill the
reasonability requirement of common law.
Some significant questions remain concerning contingent valuation.
Perplexingly, studies have reached substantially different results depending on whether individuals were asked about the price that they
would pay for natural resource preservation or the price at which they
would sell the natural resource. Willingness to pay for environmental
commodities is typically much less than the price at which persons
would sell such commodities. 26 0 The magnitude of the disparity is
for Wildlife Resources, 59 LAND ECON. 1 (1983). These authors sought to measure option value for
certain species of wildlife, such as bighorn sheep and grizzly bears, through contingent valuation
methods. After analyzing their results, the authors suggested that there was some evidence of the
reliability of the valuation, because "estimated prices were of plausible magnitude, as were the
inferred marginal time-preference rates of respondents, and individual willingness to pay exhibited
the expected relationships with respondent's income and age, the promised probability of supply
and the waiting period until the supply was made available." Id. at 14. While the results were not
without shortcomings, the authors felt a "guarded optimism about the use of contingent markets
to estimate option prices," representing a "conceptually valid measure of uncertain future use values." Id.
257. See Duffield, supra note 252, in 3 APPLIED MICRO-ECONOMICS, supra note 70, at 70 (noting that "there is some evidence that results may be replicable across different studies"); id. at 84
(noting that "sample means were shown to be relatively stable across sample years, and good internal consistence was found").
258. See Comments of the Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n, supra note 14, at 14-17.
259. Grantham & Mann, Inc. v. American Safety Prod., Inc., 831 F.2d 596, 601-02 (6th Cir.
1987). Under prevailing precedents, "[o]nce the existence of damages has been shown, all that an
award of damages requires is substantial evidence in the record to permit a factfinder to draw
reasonable inferences and make a fair and reasonable assessment of the amount of damages." Id.
at 602; see Hoehn, supra note 248, at 412; see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 379 (1927); Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 514 F.2d 690, 698 (5th
Cir. 1975).
260. See Bockstael & McConnell, CalculatingEquivalent and Compensating Variation for
Natural Resource Facilities,56 LAND ECON. 56, 61 (1980). The Bockstael and McConnell survey
observed that "[i]t is likely that any researcher in this area who has attempted to obtain willingness to sell or willingness to pay responses from users has encountered great differences in them."
Id. This difference may vary by a factor as high as twenty. Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal
Hearings, supra note 49, at 363 (statement of Fred Walgenbach, Senior Resource Economist, California Dep't of Fish and Game). See generally Gordon & Knetsch, Consumer's Surplus Measures
and the Evaluation of Resources, 55 LAND ECON. 1 (1979); Meyer, Publicly Vested Values for Fish
and Wildlife: Criteria in Economic Welfare and Interface with the Law, 55 LAND EcON. 223
(1979); Schulze, d'Arge & Brookshire, supra note 248, at 166.
It may be possible to overcome some of this disparity, however. See Hoehn, supra note 248, at

1989]

NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE

troubling to economists, 61 and raises the additional question whether
"willingness to pay" or "willingness to sell" should be used to quantify
the value of natural resources. Some economists have expressed fear
that individuals' unfamiliarity with the survey questions could undermine the reliability of the results.

26 2

The results of contingent valuation

also may be unduly dependent upon the information provided to respondents and the phrasing of the questionnaire used.263 Other economists have noted that "[elven contingent valuation methods cannot
satisfactorily estimate [existence] values because the units of measure
(dollars or income) conflict with what is to be measured.

26

4

The EPA

has argued that "estimates using existence and option values using con417 (declaring that "[w]illingness to pay and willingness to accept tend to converge as more time
and effort are given to valuation"). Moreover, much of the difference between willingness to pay
and willingness to accept may disappear once personal income limits are removed. One recent
study found that "[w]hile the compensation measure significantly exceeded the willingness-to-pay
measure for people managing their own endowments, no significant difference between the measures was found for those advising others about payment and compensation decisions." Brown,
supra note 140, at 240.
261. See Bishop, Heberlein & Kealy, supra note 248, at 619-20 (noting that disparity is "in
excess of differences that are explainable by income effects or other theoretically acceptable
means"); Duffield, supra note 252, in 3 APPLmD MIso-EcoNoMIcs, supra note 70, at 70 (stating
that "a result of these direct survey studies that has been consistently at odds with accepted theory .
is the unexpected divergence of willingness to pay and compensation (or willingness to
sell) measures"); Knetsch & Sinden, Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded: Experimental Evidence of an Unexpected Disparityin Measures of Value, 99 Q.J. EcoN. 507, 508 (1984)
(noting an "unexpectedly wide variation between the two measures"). The difference between
found measures of willingness to pay and willingness to sell may not represent a shortcoming of
contingent valuation, however. Instead, the difference may simply reflect realistic human behavioral patterns. See Glass & Muth, supra note 84, at 386 (stating that "several studies have been
conducted in which the actual exchange of money occurred, and disparities between the willingness
to buy and willingness to sell were still observed").
262. See Bishop, Heberlein & Kealy, supra note 248, at 620 (expressing concern that "[m]ost
people have not previously attempted to express their values for nonmarket goods in monetary
terms, and contingent markets are too artificial to provide a sufficient context for developing accurate values"). But see Brookshire, Thayer, Schulze & d'Arge, supra note 253, at 176 (noting that
"existing studies by Randall et al. and Brookshire, Ives, and Schulze, and Rowe et al. of remote
recreation areas certainly suggest that survey approaches provide replicable estimates of consumers' willingness to pay to prevent environmental deterioration, without prior valuation
experience").
263. See Bishop, Heberlein & Kealy, supra note 248, at 620; Samples, Dixon & Gowen, Information Disclosure and Endangered Species Valuation, 62 LAND EcoN. 306, 306 (1986); Schulze,
d'Arge & Brookshire, supra note 248, at 156-58. In one study, differences in question format
yielded results that varied by a factor of more than six. Smith, Desvousges & Fisher, supra note
245, at 287. But see Hoehn, supra note 248, at 414 (noting that "[c]areful design, pretesting, and
analysis can at least detect, if not eliminate, the impact of information bias"); Schulze, d'Arge &
Brookshire, supra note 248, at 167-68 (finding information bias largely absent in the South Coast
Air Basin experiment); Thayer, Contingent Valuation Techniques for Assessing Environmental
Impacts: FurtherEvidence, 8 J. ENvmL. EcoN. & MGmT. 27 (1981) (testing for information bias,
among other possible biases of contingent valuation, and finding no significant effect of same).
264. Talhelm & Libby, supra note 93, at 296.
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tingent valuation are so unreliable" that they should not be used."'
The United States Water Resources Council, however, has found contingent valuation sufficiently accurate for government use.2"6
Notwithstanding the apparent and potential problems, contingent
valuation offers some great advantages to policymakers. Among economic valuation tools, only contingent valuation measures the existence
value of natural resources.281 Given the potential significance of the existence value attribute,26 8 this ability is an important reason for preferring contingent valuation over tools such as travel cost valuation, which
measure only a portion of use value.269 The subjectivity of contingent
valuation, moreover, infects other forms of valuation as well.2 In many
instances, contingent valuation provides the best method for assessing
the complete economic value that individuals place on natural resource
preservation. This conclusion, however, should not obscure the undeniable shortcomings of contingent valuation.
E. Estimating Gross and Net Value of Resources
As the discussion above suggests, there are several means of valuing
natural resources, none of which are perfect. A shortcoming that each of
these valuation methods shares is the measurement of gross value,
rather than net value, a feature that overstates the true worth of resources. Net value is the value of resources reduced by the cost required
to sustain them. This cost can be difficult to measure at the present
time. Fortunately, most of the cost of producing natural resources is
265. Comments of the Envtl. Protection Agency on Dep't of the Interior Damage Assessment
Regulations, at 8 (March 19, 1986) (source on file with Author), respondingto Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 50 Fed. Reg. 52,126 (1985).
266. See 44 Fed. Reg. 72,892, 72,950 (1979) (codified at 18 C.F.R. § 713) (establishing regulations for the evaluation of benefits and costs in federal water resource projects and authorizing the
use of contingent valuation); see also 48 Fed. Reg. 10,250, 10,257 (1983) (codified at 18 C.F.R. §§
711, 713, 714, 716) (repealing the regulations and replacing them with new Economic and Environmental Principles and Guidelines for Water and Related Land Resources Implementation Studies
that retain the use of contingent valuation).
267. See, e.g., Randall, supra note 100, at 329 (declaring that "contingent valuation offers the
only means of directly estimating the total value of nonmarketed environmental assets").
268. See supra notes 90-92.
269. The NOAA Report warns that "the contingent valuation method should be used with
caution," but because it is "the only tool available at this time to estimate option and existence
values," the Report further observes that "the cost of potential biases [of contingent valuation] is
sometimes simply outweighed by its benefits." NOAA REPORT, supra note 80, at 62; see also
Smith, supra note 147, in 3 APPLED MICRO-EcoNoMICS, supra note 70, at 5-6 (noting that "[t]here
has been increasing awareness of the need to use survey based or contingent valuation methods in
valuing many types of environmental amenities").
270. See Smith, Desvousges & Fisher, supra note 245, at 289 (noting that the researcher's
judgment is an unavoidable aspect of travel cost and other measures and finding greater variance
in the results of their travel cost study than for contingent valuation).
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sunk cost in land, and the marginal cost of maintaining the resources is
likely to be low or even zero. 271 The difficulty, therefore, may be insignificant, as net value may closely approximate the measured gross value
of natural resources. 2
Even if the disparity between gross value and net value is not a
serious problem, other shortcomings plague the available methods of
measurement. Anyone developing a method of valuation must grapple
with these problems and presumably settle for an imperfect result. The
following section discusses the efforts of the Department of the Interior
to develop a suitable method and then proposes changes to the current
approach.
V.

DEVELOPING A SYSTEM OF NATURAL RESOURCE VALUATION

Having reviewed the statutory underpinnings of natural resource
valuation, the value attributes of those resources, and the available
methodologies for monetizing those values, this Article will now develop
a system for valuing natural resources under Superfund and other legal
authorities. Section A discusses regulations of the Department of the
Interior. These rules are not the final word in valuing natural resources,
however, and they contain serious shortcomings. Section B proposes
modifications to the Department of the Interior regulations that provide a more exhaustive and defensible process for placing monetary
value on damaged natural resources.
A.

Department of the Interior Regulations-A First Step

After considerable time and litigation, the Department of the Interior promulgated its regulations for assessing natural resource damages,
both for Type A273 and Type B2 74 spills. Both of these rules direct the
procedure for determining the extent of harm resulting from a hazardous substance discharge. 27 Type B rules are most relevant for economic
271. This is particularly true for increments of resources. Should an entire national park be
destroyed, there will be obvious cost savings from park services. In the more likely case of destruction of a portion of the park's resources, however, such typical costs as upkeep and construction
may be unaffected.
272. See, e.g., Rettig, Bioeconomic Models: Do They Really Help Fishery Managers?, 116
TRANSACTONs AM. FisHERmS Soc'y 405, 408 (1987) (stating that for fisheries, one can "set the
standard value of the ratio of net to gross economic value at 90%").
273. 43 C.F.R. § 11.40 (1987). At the present time Type A assessment rules are available only
for oil spills in aquatic environments, but these discharges constitute nearly two-thirds of all natural resource damages covered by Superfund. See 52 Fed. Reg. 9057 (1986).
274. 43 C.F.R. § 11.60 (1987).
275. Because this Article focuses on monetary valuation, it does not go into detail on other
aspects of the Department of the Interior rules. Briefly, however, the Type B rules provide for an
initial "preassessment screen," during which the federal or state agency responding to a Superfund
discharge samples the potentially injured or at-risk natural resources and conducts emergency res-
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valuation purposes because they deal with major spills requiring sitespecific damage valuation.
The Interior Department regulations rely primarily on "common
law and economics" for guidance in valuing natural resources.2 7 Based
on these sources, the rules focus predominantly on measuring the use
value of these resources. The Department converts resources into "services" to humans, 7 including "water for drinking, the use of fish or
wildlife for food, and the use of many components of the environment
for recreation. 2-7 Whenever possible, the Department monetizes the
loss of use of these services by market value. When market valuation
is impossible, the Department allows nonmarket methodologies, including travel cost and hedonic pricing methodologies. 280 The Department
only looks to option and existence values when use value cannot be determined.2 81 The Type B regulations generally preclude contingent valtoration when necessary. 51 Fed. Reg. 27,729-30 (1986) (codified at 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.20-11.25
(1987)). In most instances, this sample is followed by the assessment phase, in which the agency
identifies potentially responsible parties, determines the approximate magnitude of resources damaged, and decides whether Type A or Type B assessment is appropriate to this discharge. Id. at
27,732-33 (codified at 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.30-11.34 (1987)). If Type B assessment is indicated, the
regulations provide detailed procedures for measuring the site-specific extent of injury to natural
resources. Id. at 27,733-42 (codified at 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.60-11.69 (1987)). This measuring is followed
by a quantification of natural resource damage that focuses on reduction in services to the public
using the site and the feasibility of cost-effective restoration. Id. at 27,742-48 (codified at 43 C.F.R.
§§ 11.70-11.73 (1987)). Once quantification is accomplished, monetary damages may then be ascertained. Id. at 27,748-51 (codified at 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.80-11.84 (1987)); see supra notes 21-23 and
accompanying text. The Type B rules culminate with a post-assessment phase for instances when
restoration or replacement is used in response to natural resource damage. 51 Fed. Reg. 27,751-53
(1988) (codified at 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.90-11.93 (1987)).
The Type A rules for lesser harms to natural resources are less elaborate. Following the preassessment screen and assessment phase described above, the lead agency may conclude that Type A
assessment is indicated. In conducting a Type A assessment, the lead agency supplies certain defined data inputs for a computer model, known as the Natural Resource Damage Assessment
Model for Coastal and Marine Environments. This program then projects the likely extent of natural resource damage and the economic value of these losses, based on the valuation principles
contained in the Type B regulations. 51 Fed. Reg. 27,751 to 27,752 (1988) (codified at 43 C.F.R. §§
11.90-11.91 (1987)).
276. 51 Fed. Reg. 27,690 (1986).
277. See id. at 27,719 (stating that "[iln reference to the comments concerning services without clear human use, the Department believes that only when a service has a human recipient can
it be classified as a use per se").
278. Id. at 27,686. This judgment is based on the Department's perception of "traditional
economic measures." Id.
279. Id. at 27,749 (codified at 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(c) (1987)); see id. at 27,691 (stating that "[i]f
the injured resource is traded in a market, the diminution of the market price should be the measure of lost use value" and "[o]nly when the injured resource is not traded in a market or when
that market is not reasonably competitive, and no comparable sales are available for use in an
appraisal, may the authorized official use any of the nonmarketed resource methodologies").
280. Id. at 27,750 (codified at 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.83(d)(3), (4) (1987)).
281. Id. at 27,749 (codified at 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(b)(2) (1987)) (stating that "[e]stimation of
option and existence values shall be used only if the authorized official determines that no use
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uation studies.282
The Department of the Interior Type B regulations also address
the use of restoration cost for damages. The rules define damages as
"the cost to accomplish the cost-effective [restoration] alternative that
provides the lost services. '2 83 Thus, even the restoration authorization
in the Interior Department regulations is limited to restoring "services"
that have use value and ignores other values of the damaged natural
resources. Furthermore, restoration seldom is the damage measurement
of choice under these rules. Restoration cost may be used only when it
yields a damage estimate that is lower than the estimates of lost use
value. In most instances, "[tihe authorized official shall select the lesser
of: restoration or replacement costs; or diminution of use values as the
measure of damages. '28 4 One district court has approved this least
costly approach to measurement of natural resource damages. 28 5 The
Interior Department did recognize that certain "special resources" may
be destroyed forever through its cost-effective approach. For these resources, restoration costs are the proper measure of damages.2 86 The
Department makes clear, however, that this exception is to be very
28 7
narrow.
The subsequently promulgated Type A damage assessment rules
follow valuation principles that are similar to those in the Type B rules.
The simplified Type A damage measurement is accomplished through a
computer model, known as the Natural Resource Damage Assessment
Model for Coastal and Marine Environments (NRDAM/CME).2 88 Like
the Type B assessments, this model takes no account of existence or
values can be determined"). This section is to be used only in "extraordinary circumstances." 51
Fed. Reg. 27,719 (1986).
282. Id. at 27,750 (codified at 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(d)(5)(ii) (1987)) (stating that "use of contingent valuation methodology to explicitly estimate option and existence values should be used only
if the authorized official determines that no use values can be determined").
283. Id. at 27,748 (codified at 43 C.F.R. § 11.81(0(1) (1987)); see also id. at 27,748-49 (codified at 43 C.F.R. § 11.82 (1987)) (describing standards for formulating the restoration methodology
plan).
284. Id. at 27,733 (codified at 43 C.F.R. § 11.35(b)(2) (1987)). This rule is grounded largely in
the Department's finding that "the general common law measure of damages is the lesser of diminution of use value and restoration or replacement costs" and its conclusion that "Congress intended to incorporate traditional notions of damage measurement into the natural resource
damage assessment process." Id. at 27,705.
285. Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F. Supp. 665, 676 (D. Idaho 1986). According to this
decision: "Damages to the natural resources may be calculated on a value basis and a cost-ofrestoration basis. The calculation which provides the least recovery in terms of dollars is the appropriate measure of damages." Id.
286. 51 Fed. Reg. 27,724-25 (1986). At the time of the original rule, the Department concluded that it needed a "closer look" at this concept before formulating final regulations on such
"special resources." Id. at 27,725.
287. Id. at 27,724.
288. For a summary overview of this model, see 52 Fed. Reg. 9045-48 (1987).
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intrinsic values of natural resources.28 9 The computer program assigns
no value to unused resources. Indeed, under the NRDAM/CME, only
the destroyed fish that would have been harvested are included in the
damages assessment.2 90 An obvious consequence of this approach is that
"only commercial or recreationally important species have measurable
social value. 2' 9 1 Even some recreational uses of natural resources are
valueless under the Department's present approach because it focuses
entirely on consumptive uses. Partly for this reason, important marine
mammals, such as whales, dolphins, and sea otters, are valued at zero
under the NRDAM/CME used in Type A spills.2 92
The now final regulations are an important first step in monetizing
key environmental features. The regulations are not, however, the last
word. Superfund requires the Department to review and revise the regulations every two years.29 3 As described in the following subsection, the
current regulations are both incomplete and inadequate, and require
modification in order to accomplish the goal of accurately valuing damaged natural resources.
B.

The Next Step-More Complete Valuation Procedures

The long awaited promulgation of the Department of the Interior
regulations has not quieted the controversy over the proper valuation of
natural resources. Environmental organizations filed a direct challenge
to the rules in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.294
Several state governments also challenged the rules as insufficiently
protective of natural resource values. 295 Organizations representing industry likewise sued the Interior Department over the natural resource
damage regulations.29 6 These actions, which the circuit court has consolidated, raise numerous issues beyond the valuation of natural re289. See id. at 9083 (stating that "there is insufficient information to incorporate the concept
of option and existence values into the NRDAM/CME").
290. Id. at 9087.
291. Comments of the Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n, supra note 14, at 19.
292. See Comments of the Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n on Dep't of the Interior Proposed Type A
Natural Resource Damage Assessment Regulations, at 14 (August 18, 1986) [hereinafter Comments
of the Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n] (source on file with Author), responding to Proposal by the United
States Dep't of the Interior, 51 Fed. Reg. 16,636 (1986).
293. 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(3) (1982).
294. See National Wildlife Fed'n, Envt'l Defense Fund v. United States Dep't of the Interior,
No. 87-1266 (D.C. Cir. filed June 18, 1987).
295. See, e.g., id. (consolidating California v. United States Dep't of the Interior, No. 86-1591
(D.C. Cir.); Colorado v. United States Dep't of the Interior, No. 87-1265 (D.C. Cir.); New Jersey
Dep't of Envt'l Protection v. United States Dep't of the Interior, No. 86-1580 (D.C. Cir.)).
296. See id. (consolidating Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States Dep't of the Interior, No.
86-1594 (D.C. Cir.); Public Servs. Elec. & Gas Co. & Dam Corp. v. United States Dep't of the
Interior, No. 86-1597 (D.C. Cir.)).
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sources.2 97 Nevertheless, valuation issues are central to the controversy
over the Interior Department regulations. Regardless of the outcome of
this litigation, there are sound reasons for modifying the existing
regulations.
Many critics contend that the Interior Department's regulations
underestimate damage values. 298 Senator Max Baucus, a cosponsor of

the Superfund amendments, argued that "the rules to date strongly discourage natural resource damage claims from ever being brought and
would severely reduce recoverable damages in those few cases where
they were sought.

'299

The current regulations may undervalue certain

categories of resources; wetlands, for example, fulfill a vital ecological
niche that has been recognized expressly by federal executive order,300
yet wetlands have a relatively low valuation under the Interior Department's methodology because they have little direct use or market
value.3 0 1 Many significant marine mammals are valueless under the

Type A rules. Damage awards under the current rules seldom will be
sufficient to restore the resources destroyed. 2
Empirical studies bear out these criticisms of the Interior Department regulations. The current regulations understate true natural resource damages because of their exclusive focus on use value and heavy
reliance on market valuation. In a test of the Type A regulations, the
State of New York used the NRDAM/CME to assess the damages from
a hypothetical spill of 2.2 million pounds of PCBs in a narrow estuary
similar to the mouth of the Hudson River.303 The model measured re297. See, e.g., Non-Binding Statement of Issues of the National Wildlife Federation, National Wildlife Fed'n, Envt'l Defense Fund v. United States Dep't of the Interior, No. 87-1266
(filed July 22, 1987). Disputed issues include the proper parties for conducting assessments, the
degree of public participation in assessments, standards of proof, and covered resources. Id. at 3-4.
298. See, e.g., Dower & Atkeson, The Unrealized Potentialof SARA: Mobilizing Protection
for Natural Resources, 1987 ENVIRONMENT 41.
299. 132 CONG. REc. S14,930 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statement of Sen. Baucus).
300. See Exec. Order No. 11,990, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,961 (1977).
301. See Dower, Valuing Natural Resources, 1987 ENVIRONMENT 10, 10. Dower states:
Wetlands do not often provide much in the way of direct use value to an owner (which is why
so many are filled in), but are thought to provide a wider range of other use values to the
general public including pollutant removal, habitat breeding grounds, aesthetic pleasure (such
as bird watching), and flood retention.
Id. (emphasis in original).
302. See Comments of the State of California, Dep't of Justice, on Dep't of the Interior Proposed Natural Resource Damage Assessments Regulations, at 5-6 (March 21, 1986) [hereinafter
California Comments] (source on file with Author), responding to Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
50 Fed. Reg. 52,126 (1985). The comments assert, "Because the diminution of use value will almost
always be less than restoration or replacement costs, under the proposed rule, damage awards will
rarely be sufficient to enable state and federal trustees to restore or replace the injured resources."
Id.
303. See Johnson, supra note 50, at 9.
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source damage to be 571,509 dollars through the year 2034.304 In a real
case, however, the Hudson River was contaminated by a smaller quantity of PCBs30 5 and sustained far greater damages than those projected
by the Interior Department's computer model. For example, over one
million dollars per year have been lost in commercial harvest of striped
bass, according to regulatory impact statements.3 0 6 Researchers have
calculated additional millions of dollars of damage in recreational fishing through the travel cost method. 0 7 The results of the New York
study are particularly revealing. First, the NRDAM/CME understated
the true losses in use value alone, without even considering the additional lost existence value. Second, the model's results were not only
low, they were low by orders of magnitude. The current approach vastly
underestimates the value of damaged natural resources.3 08 Other tests
of the Interior Department's model confirm its tendency to understate
natural resource damages.3 0 9 While authors of these studies considered
only the Type A damage assessment model, the Type B regulations also
overlook potentially significant natural resource values.
Finally, the regulations focus on use value almost exclusively,
which is directly contrary to the text of Superfund. Section 301 of
Superfund, which authorizes the Interior Department regulations, directs that the rules shall take into account "factors including, but not
limited to, replacement value, use value, and ability of the ecosystem or
resource to recover." 310
Despite their shortcomings, the present regulations are a considerable advance in the valuation of natural resources. The rules require
304. Id.
305. Id. A spill of between 510,000 and 660,000 pounds of PCBs occurred upstream on the
Hudson River, although only 167,000 pounds reached the estuary below the federal dam at Troy,
New York. The larger spill in the test run of the NRDAM/CME was used to ensure the conservatism and fairness of the New York test comparison results. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 9-10.
308. Indeed, even when Johnson attempted to adjust his assumptions to increase the damages estimated by the model, "the computed damages bore little resemblance to other measurements of economic damage resulting from the PCB-contamination of the Hudson River." Id. at 12
n.38.
309. See Comments of the Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, supra note 292, at 2. The Federation commented, "The values obtained for spills in Interior's runs of the model (see Type A Background
Document) are also stunningly low in many cases-often far less than the value of the material
spilled." Id. Yet another report suggests that: "After an Oil Spill in Washington State, the Natural
Resource Damage Assessment Put a High Value on a Relatively Sterile and Already Polluted Pebble Beach in an Industrialized Area, and A Relatively Low Value on an Ecologically Sensitive
Wildlife Sanctuary ....." Olson, Outline of Discussion, in AMERICAN PETROLEUM INST., NATIONAL
RESOURCE DAMAGE AssEssENT CONFERENCE PROGRAM, at 4-5 (June 16, 1987) [hereinafter AmERiCAN PETROLEUM INST. CONFERENCE].

310. 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(2) (1982).
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amendments, however, that measure better the full value of damaged
resources. Indeed, unless the Interior Department modifies the current
regulations, they may become functionally obsolete. 1' The State of California has proposed to the Interior Department the best modifications
to the current regulations. Under the California plan, restoration cost
would provide the presumptive measure of natural resource damages,
unless restoration is infeasible or disproportionately expensive.3 12 This
Article next explains and justifies the use of the California proposal.
1. Use of Restoration Cost and the Primacy of Preservation
Principles of legal interpretation and sound public policy dictate
that environmental protection and preservation be the primary, if not
the sole, objective of natural resource damage valuation. Restoring the
polluted site is the best method of preserving the environment.313 In
addition to restoration costs, additional damages may be necessary
while restoration is proceeding.
An analysis of proper valuation begins with the text and history o,
Superfund in order to demonstrate that restoration costs are consistent
with the statutory scheme. Although the Act does not specify the
proper measure of damages, the text of the law suggests Congress's interest in restoration. The law states that "damages shall not be limited
by the sums which can be used to restore or replace such resources." ' 4
This phrasing implies that Congress intended restoration costs to be
generally available, at minimum. In addition, the 1986 amendments to
Superfund added the requirement that monies recovered by the federal
government be used "only to restore, rehabilitate, or acquire the
equivalent of such natural resources" as were damaged.3 1 5 This language does not require expressly the use of restoration cost as the measure of damages, but it does suggest that Congress expected damages at
least to approximate the cost of restoration or replacement of damaged
natural resources.
311.

See Kenison, Issues in the Litigation of NaturalResource Damage Claims, in AMERisupra note 309, at 24. Kenison observed: "If the Department of
Interior's damage assessment regulations survive challenges. . . states will abandon that methodology and the rebuttable presumption which compliance with it confers in favor of more innovative, yet reliable damage assessment methodologies." Id.
312. See California Comments, supra note 302, at 6.
313. Replacement cost damages to obtain new sites may sometimes advance the preservationist objectives of Superfund. Generally, however, restoration is preferable, because it does not
irrevocably sacrifice the damaged site. For a discussion of the shortcomings of replacement as a
response to natural resource damages, see supra text accompanying notes 170-71. One review concluded that "CERCLA's overriding purpose [is] to protect and restore the environment following
the adverse consequences of hazardous waste disposal." Note, supra note 151, at 1115.
314. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (1982).
315. Id.
CAN PETROLEUM INST. CONFERENCE,
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The legislative history behind the original Superfund law further
supports granting restoration cost damages. 1 6 The floor comments of
legislative sponsor Senator George Mitchell and of Senator Robert Stafford supported the use of restoration cost.31 7 The Senate Report on
Superfund explained that a purpose of the bill was "to preserve the
public trust in the nation's natural resources," 31 and that the public
trustee should "seek restitution for such damages or restoration of such
resources."3 19 This evidence is admittedly inconclusive, and contrary
legislative history also exists.2 0
The legislative history underlying the 1986 Superfund reauthorization and amendments is much clearer in support of restoration costs
when natural resources are damaged. While natural resource damages
received little congressional attention during the amendment process,
the comments that are available criticize the Interior Department's proposed rule.32 1 Senator Max Baucus of Montana, a cosponsor of
Superfund, contended that "the Interior Department has ignored the
intent of Congress and repeatedly erected barriers to the recovery of
316. A legal review of this history concludes that there "is some ambiguity in CERCLA's
legislative history, but the better view is that full cost of restorationis available when a government agency so chooses." Breen, supra note 14, at 10,307 (emphasis in original). Breen notes that
Congress deleted provisions that expressly referred to "economic measures of damages," and retained the language that originally appeared to authorize restoration cost recovery. Id.
317. 126 CONG. REc. 30,941 (1980). Senator Mitchell stated that natural resource damages
should provide "for the cost of restoring new trees" to a public park. Id. Senator Stafford stated
that natural resource damages could be obtained after "a restoration plan is developed." Id. at
30,986.
318. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1980).
319. Id. Intended use of restoration cost is also implied by Senator Stafford's statement that
natural resource damages could be obtained after "a restoration plan is developed." 126 CONG. REc.
30,986 (1980).
320. Senator Simpson stated on the floor that natural resource damage recoveries should
"achieve[] cost effectiveness by awarding the difference in value before and after the injury, and
where the injured interest can be restored to its original condition for less than the difference in
value, the cost of restoration is used." 126 CONG. REc. 30,986 (1980). This statement seems expressly to suggest the market value and "lesser cost" portions of the Interior Department's current
rules. Senator Simpson, however, was not a leading advocate of Superfund, and his interpretive
views should not be given great weight. See Breen, supra note 14, at 10,308 (noting that Simpson
was the only member of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee who voted against
reporting the Superfund bill to the floor of the Senate). The courts have recognized that the views
of individual legislators typically "are entitled to little or no weight, particularly when they are
unclear or conflict with one another." Murphy v. Empire of Am., 746 F.2d 931, 935 (2d Cir. 1984);
Blitz v. Donovan, 740 F.2d 1242, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating that "legislators' remarks during a
floor debate, even in the Congress that enacted the legislation, do not control statutory interpretation and generally are not accorded significant weight" (citing Weinberger v. Ross, 456 U.S. 25, 35
n.15 (1982))); see also Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades v. NLRB, 796 F.2d 1328, 1343
n.16 (11th Cir. 1986) (declining to grant authoritative weight to statements by congressional opponents of legislation); Brock v. Writers Guild of Am., 762 F.2d 1349, 1356 (9th Cir. 1985).
321. The final promulgation of the natural resource damage regulations did not occur until
after the passage of the Superfund amendments.
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329

damages to natural resources, ' and that market valuation was an inappropriate method for valuing most public resources because it "would
result in far less resource restoration, or replacement, than Congress
had intended."323 The Senator feared that the Interior Department's
natural resource damage regulations could frustrate a key purpose of
Superfund by giving industry an incentive to act carelessly, because industry would not have to internalize the true cost of its activities. 24
Senator Baucus would modify the regulations to "measure damages,
based on replacement or restoration, or acquisition of equivalent resources-where restoration or replacement is technically impossible,
plus any lost use value or other damages.31 2 5 Senator Stafford, perhaps

the leading author and sponsor of Superfund, concurred expressly with
Baucus's criticism of the Interior Department rules.3 2 6
In the House of Representatives, Representative Walter Jones of
North Carolina largely echoed the criticisms from the Senate. He supported restoration, observing that the "purpose of the regime, rather, is
to make whole the natural resources that suffer injury from releases of
hazardous substances.

32

7

Representative Jones argued specifically for

natural resource damage recovery comparable to the California Plan in
which restoration would be normative unless technically infeasible or
disproportionately expensive. 28 While the 1986 legislative history is not
dispositive, 29 its clarity and strength suggest that Congress intended to
322. 132 CONG. REC. S14,930 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986).
323. Id. at S14,931.
324. See id. at S14,930. Senator Baucus stated:
These regulations also reduce the incentive on the part of industries to exercise care in order
to avoid liability for natural resource damages. By thus failing to force these industries to
internalize the true cost of their activities to society, the proposals issued to date are impediments to the restoration and replacement of resources, and incentives to careless, not careful,
conduct.
Id.
325. Id. at S14,931.
326. Id. Senator Stafford stated that Senator Baucus had raised "a number of important
points" and that Stafford "concur[red] in those remarks, and agree[d] with the statement he ha[d]
just made." Id.
327. Id. at H9613 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986).
328. Id. Representative Jones stated,
The basic measure of damages under CERCLA, as it is under the Clean Water Act, is the
costs of restoration, replacement or acquisition of the equivalent of natural resources injured
by unlawful releases. Where, of course, restoration is technically impossible or the costs
thereof are grossly disproportionate to the value of the resources to society as a whole, then
other valuation measures, both market and nonmarket, must be used.
Id.
329. Floor remarks of individual legislators seldom are considered to be controlling in statutory interpretation. See supra note 320. The statements of sponsors are more persuasive, however,
and should be given more weight. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384,
394-95 (1951) (noting that "[iut is the sponsors that we look to when the meaning of the statutory
words is in doubt"); Monterrey Coal Co. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 743
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measure natural resource damages by the cost of restoration under
Superfund.
Although this congressional concern for restoration is manifest, it
should not be overemphasized. A blanket mandate for restoration cost
recovery would be inappropriate. Congress knew how to mandate recovery of restoration costs, as it did in the Clean Water Act,330 but chose
not to do so under Superfund. Rather, the legislature granted some discretion to the Interior Department to find the optimal measure of natural resource damages. This discretionary authority, however, is not a
license to disregard the purposes of Superfund. The present regulations
appear to underemphasize the importance of restoration under the Act.
Other federal environmental legislation authorizes broader recovery
of restoration costs. The Clean Water Act expressly provides for recovery of restoration cost.33 1 Perhaps more helpful is the Deepwater Port

Act, which makes certain parties liable for damages to natural resources. 2 The legislative history behind this provision reflects a congressional intent in favor of restoration costs. 3 Even more relevant is
the generalized recovery authority of the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act, because the Superfund language appears to have been taken
from the 1978 amendments to that Act. 3 4 Legislative history behind
the provision indicates that federal and state governments may recover
restoration or replacement costs. 3 This pattern of federal legislation
on natural resource damages, therefore, indicates a clear concern for
restoration.336
F.2d 589, 596 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting that "sponsor's . . . interpretation is ordinarily accorded
substantial weight").
The 1986 legislative history, however, may be discounted on other grounds. Although Congress
amended the natural resource damage provisions, the changes were procedural and did not touch
the valuation issue. See, e.g., Hayes & Mackerron, Superfund II: A New Mandate, [Special Report] Env't Rep. (BNA), 35-36 (1987). Thus the 1986 comments were not contemporaneous with
the passage of damage valuation authority and are postenactment legislative history. While courts
will not ignore these statements, relatively little credence should be granted to postenactment legislative history. See Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IowA L. REV. 195, 204-05 (1983). Arguably, however, the 1986 comments on
natural resource damage valuation are iot truly postenactment, because the entirety of Superfund
was reauthorized at this time. Obviously, the significance of these floor statements is muddy. The
best approach accords these statements significant weight but does not regard them as dispositive
of the proper interpretation of Superfund.
330. See supra note 26.
331. See supra note 26.
332. See supra note 31.
333. S. REP. No. 1217, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1975).
334. Breen, supra note 14, at 10,309.
335. H.R. REP. No. 590, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 192 (1977).
336. Congressional interest in conservation of natural resources is found in other federal legislation as well. For example, the National Environmental Policy Act emphasizes "the critical importance of restoring and maintaining environmental quality." 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1982). In
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Use of restoration costs also is consistent with the state's role as
trustee for resources. As the court held in Zoe Colocotroni, "the Commonwealth must have the ability to have the corpus of said public trust
reimbursed for the diminution attributable to the wrongdoers. '" 7 Mere
money, however, does not replace the damaged natural resource trust.
When the resources of a trust are damaged, the fiduciary must restore
or replace them.3 8'
These related statutes and decisions, of course, are not dispositive
of natural resource damages under Superfund. As the Clean Water Act
illustrates, Congress knew how to compel restoration cost as the measure of damages and chose not to do so in Superfund. Hence, it would
be a mistake to employ restoration costs as the automatic measure of
damages. Evidence of congressional intent for Superfund and related
statutes, however, does reflect considerable concern for restoration that
should be sufficient to render this measure a presumptive method for
resource valuation.
This discussion should provide sufficient legal foundation for the
use of restoration costs in measuring natural resource damages. Sound
public policy also leads to this conclusion. At first glance, restoration
cost appears to be inferior, because it is a cost-based, supply-side measure, rather than a demand-side, value-based measure of natural resource value. For this reason, when natural resource economics
advances far enough to provide an adequate demand-side measure, reliance on restoration cost will become inappropriate. At present, however, the economic tools for valuing natural resources are of
questionable accuracy. Some methods have inherent deficiencies, such
as the failure to consider any existence value of resources. All the current methods have significant methodological shortcomings and yield
divergent results.-" ' Without a perfect method of valuation, policymakacknowledgement of this national policy, courts have compelled restoration, even under statutes
that do not expressly authorize this remedy. See United States v. Cumberland Farms of Conn.,
Inc., 647 F. Supp. 1166 (D. Mass. 1986), aff'd, 826 F.2d 1151 (1st Cir. 1987). Recently, when a
farming corporation converted a wetland into farmland, without obtaining the required Clean
Water Act permit, an Army Corps of Engineers request for compelled private restoration was
granted. On appeal, the First Circuit held that "the district court had authority to issue such
restorative orders so as to effectuate the stated goals of the Clean Water Act 'to maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters."' See, e.g., United States v.
Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960); United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 526 F.2d 1306
(5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Robinson, 570 F. Supp. 1157 (M.D. Fla. 1983). Similar restoration
orders also have been required under the River and Harbors Act.
337. Puerto Rico v. S. S. Zoe Colocotroni, 456 F. Supp. 1327, 1344 n.42 (D.P.R. 1978).
338. Note, supra note 151, at 1105. For an early case adopting this reasoning, see Feather
River Lumber Co. v. United States, 30 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1929).
339. Two leading natural resource economists have suggested recently that "[w]e know of no
social scientists who suggest that a quantitative 'total value framework' can be designed that will
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ers should employ restoration cost as the one reasonably accurate and
replicable procedure for measuring natural resource damages. This approach acknowledges the current ignorance of economic valuation of re40
sources by adopting a cautious, preservationist approach.1
The measurement uncertainty is even more apparent for resources
that may possess quasi-option value. By definition, this value is unknown and therefore unmeasurable, at least at present.4 1 Yet one can
know that quasi-option value ultimately may be quite significant for
some resources. s4 2 Quasi-option value may be particularly significant for
idiosyncratic resources that have little apparent value to man. 43 While
quasi-option value cannot be measured, use of restoration cost recovery
at least offers hope that the value can be restored to the natural
environment.
Additional reasons counsel at least for the presumptive use of restoration costs. Economics is not the only inexact science. Mankind's
knowledge of the workings and the significance of natural ecology is
also deficient. Natural resources may have great undiscovered practical
value. More importantly,
nature's complex interrelationships are not
fully understood. 3 44 While scientists make advances periodically, "the
biotic mechanism is so complex that its workings may never be fully
yield predictable, consistent, and indisputable total social evaluations." Talheln & Libby, supra
note 93, at 294.
340. One ambitious effort to monetize wetlands candidly conceded that "the state of the art
in wetlands valuation will lag behind the need to make wetlands management decisions for the
foreseeable future." Batie & Shabman, Estimating the Economic Value of Wetlands: Principles,
Methods and Limitations, 10 COASTAL ZONE MGMT. J. 255, 274 (1982). Given this weakness, the

authors conclude that so long as "accurate value estimates may be difficult to attain," the "most
feasible valuation tool for natural wetlands is the cost of substitutes." Id. When reliable economic
information is limited, the best option is to "stress wetlands preservation." Id. This analysis applies equally well to most other categories of natural resources, for which there is no precise monetization tool currently available.
341. See Randall, supra note 100, at 330 (stating that "[t]he literature does not yet include
empirical estimates of quasi-option value").
342. See id. (noting that study provides "some numerical examples that suggest that quasioption value may be much larger than ordinary option value when preservation is an alternative to
irreversible development").
343. See H. ROLSTON, supra note 52, at 80, (stating that "[iut is typically odd, useless, and
often rare things that have high scientific values, like the finches on the Galapagos, for the clues
they furnish to life's development and survival").
344. See D. EHRENFELD, supra note 7, at 190-91. As the naturalist Ehrenfeld explains:
[E]verything in Nature-including nearly all species-is highly interconnected and nearly
everything has its own part to play in maintaining the natural order: consequently, nearly all
species are significant, have resource value. Remove a species, even a seemingly trivial one
from a resource standpoint, and we are more than likely to feel the consequences somehow,
somewhere, some day.
Id. While Ehrenfeld rejects the idea that every species or habitat is essential to humankind, he
emphasizes that we cannot know or predict in advance the significance of a given species. Id. at
192.
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understood."34 5 Many people know that the dodo bird is extinct, for
example, but who could have predicted that its extinction would lead
inexorably to the extinction of a species of South Pacific tree."4 6
Humans are arrogant in presuming to be certain of the ultimate
value of any natural resource. Humankind's present ignorance, or at
least uncertainty, should lead to recognition of the homeostasis of nature. Homeostasis describes nature's complex symbiosis and interdependence, as well as its ability to adapt to outside stress. 47 Ultimately,
humans are at the mercy of this planet's nature, and people are far
safer relying on nature's unthinking adaptation than on humankind's
incomplete knowledge of ecology's workings.
Indeed, this complex homeostasis may be the greatest value of nature. One philosopher has suggested that "[t]he balance of Nature is, in
other words, a kind of ultimate value. 3 48 Self-interest suggests that humankind take a conservative approach toward nature, in the form of a
policy that eschews the avoidable elimination of natural resources.
Preservation should be at least a presumptive goal of natural resource
policy.
Recognition of this preservationist principle carries policy implications for natural resource damages. Whenever someone or something
damages a site's resources, steps should be taken to enable natural, homeostatic forces to restore the site to balance. Doing so, however, may
require human action in order to cleanse the site of trauma and to initi345. A. LEOPOLD, supra note 9, at 220. Leopold further noted:
The outstanding scientific discovery of the twentieth century is not television, or radio, but
rather the complexity of the land organism. Only those who know the most about it can appreciate how little is known about it. The last word in ignorance is the man who says of an
animal or plant: "What good is it." If the land mechanism as a whole is good, then every part
is good, whether we understand it or not. If the biota, in the course of aeons, has built something we like but do not understand, then who but a fool would discard seemingly useless
parts?
Id. at 176-77.
346. The interesting explanation for this result is that the seeds of the Calvaria major tree
could germinate only after passing through the gizzard of the dodo. Destruction of the dodo eliminated the tree's reproductive ability. See D. EHRENFELD, supra note 7, at 191.
347. See, e.g., H. ROLSTON, supra note 52, at 14. Rolston observes:
Perhaps the paramount law in ecological theory is that of homeostasis. In material, our planetary ecosystem is essentially closed, and life proceeds by recycling transformations. In energy,
the system is open, with balanced solar input and output, the cycling being in energy subsystems of aggradation and degradation. Homeostasis, it should be noted, is at once an achievement and a tendency. Systems recycle, and there is energy balance; yet the systems are not
static, but dynamic, as the forces that yield equilibrium are in flux, seeking equilibrium yet
veering from it to bring counter forces into play. This perpetual stir, tending to and deviating
from equilibrium, drives the evolutionary process.
Id.
348. Colwell, The Balance of Nature:A Groundfor Human Values, in 26 MAIN CuRzRErs IN
MODERN THOUGHT,

Nov.-Dec. 1969, at 50.
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ate natural processes. Restoration cost recovery may be necessary to
undertake these actions.
Significantly, the principle of homeostasis also rejects expensive
and elaborate restoration projects, which strive to replicate the site's
prior condition. This "boutique" restoration supplants ecology's balance
with humankind's view of how nature should look. Although all of the
restored resources may be organic, the result is as artificial as plastic
trees. Once a site has been altered, by humans or otherwise, its natural
fate is modified. Only by letting nature take its course can people fulfill
the important objective of natural homeostasis. Consequently, a relatively simple, minimalist restoration
that cleanses the site of excessive
3 49
human-made stress is best.
These legal and policy reasons for the general utilization of restoration cost do not support its use in all episodes of natural resource damage. Congress did not intend the unvarying or automatic use of
restoration cost. Nor does every incidence of natural resource damage
threaten nature's balance and humanity's fate. Nevertheless, restoration is important. Restoration should provide a presumptive methodology to which there are exceptions: restoration may be impossible or too
costly. This prospect is discussed in the following section.
2.

Cost Considerations and Alternatives to Restoration

Restoration should not be employed in some circumstances. When
a site is damaged beyond repair and recovery and restoration is infeasible, alternative measures should be used. Even the most vigorous advocates of restoration cost recovery recognize that restoration cost should
not be used when it yields a result that is grossly disproportionate to
the actual damages.3 5 0 This view is consistent with congressional intent
behind Superfund. While Congress was concerned with preservation of
natural resources, it was also concerned with economic efficiency and
reasonableness of natural resource damages. All actions under
Superfund's national contingency plan are subject to a cost-effectiveness test, which the statute expressly imposes.3 5 '
This grossly disproportionate test, however, merely begs the critical
question. One must establish a measuring stick against which restoration costs are tested before one can conclude that they are grossly disproportionate to true resource value. In some instances, intuition
349. See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text (discussing the current concepts of restoration ecology that generally support this result).
350. See, e.g., Breen, supra note 14, at 10,309-10.
351. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(7) (1982) (standards for national contingency plan); see 50 Fed. Reg.
52,128-29 (1985) (indicating the Department of the Interior's view of the role of cost-effectiveness
in natural resource damage assessments).
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suggests that restoration costs are unreasonably excessive. Intuition,
however, is not sufficiently rigorous or reliable to employ in the legal
valuation of natural resources. Some methodology is needed to compare
with restoration costs in order to determine whether the latter costs are
excessive.
The choice of this yardstick methodology is crucial to the ultimate
measure of damages. If the reasonableness of restoration costs is tested
against a valuation methodology that tends to yield low natural resource values, restoration may often seem unduly costly. Under the Department of the Interior's current regulations, many restoration
projects would seemingly require grossly disproportionate costs. Under
the Type A methodology, for example, certain marine mammals are valued at zero. 2 Any restoration efforts would be grossly disproportionate
to this measure. Because the current regulations substantially undervalue some natural resources, these rules should not be used to test the
reasonableness of restoration costs.
The search for a methodology against which to test the reasonableness of restoration costs leads inevitably to contingent valuation. All
the other methods ignore the various types of existence value and
therefore may substantially understate the true value of natural resources.35 3 While contingent valuation is imperfect, the procedure provides at least a rough estimate of natural resource value, which is all
that is necessary to test the reasonableness of restoration cost. Absolute
reliance on contingent valuation is inappropriate because some episodes
of resource damage may lend themselves better to other methodologies.
As a general rule, however, contingent valuation offers the most complete approach for monetization of natural resource damages.
Reliance on contingent valuation reopens the question whether
willingness to pay or willingness to sell should provide the measure of
natural resource value. The choice will be controversial, because willingness to pay yields lower damages. 3 4 Willingness to pay currently has
more empirical support,3 5 5 but several persuasive reasons counsel for re352.
353.

See supra note 292.
See supra text accompanying notes 203-06; supra notes 232-33 and accompanying text.

354. See, e.g., NOAA

REPORT,

supra note 80, at 61-62 (summarizing various studies finding

that willingness to sell may exceed willingness to pay by five- to twenty-fold).
355. See 51 Fed. Reg. 27,721 (1986) (noting that "less is known about methods to implement
the willingness-to-accept criterion than the willingness-to-pay criterion"). California, for example,
has considered the choice and opted to use willingness to pay as a measure of natural resource
damages. Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal Hearings, supra note 49, at 363 (statement of
Fred Walgenbach, Senior Resource Economist, California Dep't of Fish and Game). In 1979, the
U.S. Water Resources Council chose to use willingness to pay measures, because "reliable empirical
methods for estimating willingness to accept compensation for losses have not been developed." 44
Fed. Reg. 72,950 (1979).
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liance on willingness to sell estimates. Willingness to sell is more democratic, more consistent with the context of natural resource damages,
offers greater promise of complete accuracy and, thus, better fulfills the
paramount purpose of Superfund.
The public and democratic nature of natural resource damage valuation favors a willingness to sell standard. Some commentators hypothesize that the disparity of results between the two methods is primarily
because of the "income effect." One's current resources constrain one's
willingness to pay for any product. Willingness to pay estimates tend to
be lower because surveyed individuals lack the income to pay more;3 58
willingness to pay estimates reflect the income position of respondents
as much as they measure the value of resources. The income effect also
influences willingness to sell, 57 but much less so. Should natural resource damage estimates encompass the income effect or not? This Article argues that they should not. Private resources, distributed through
the free market, evidence the varying incomes of bidders. The number
of "votes" possessed by one person in the marKctplace are determined
by the number of dollars in his possession. In the public forum, however, each citizen has a vote of equal value, regardless of his wealth.
Similarly, government does not price admission to our national parks at
free market, profit-maximizing levels, but rather keeps the price low so
that even poor Americans can enjoy the parks. 5 8 Consequently, the
chosen measure for valuing publicly held natural resources should avoid
an undue income effect.3 59
A second reason for selecting willingness to sell derives from the
context of natural resource damages. Government seeks to recover damages to resources that the public already owns. It makes more sense
intuitively to view the natural resources as "sold" to the damaging
party, rather than to require the public to "pay" for resources that already belong to it. The willingness to pay approach is more relevant to
enhancing wildlife opportunities beyond those already extant.36 0 The
356. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 140, at 240 (providing both theoretical and empirical support for the limiting effect of income on willingness to pay estimates); see also Knetsch & Sinden,
supra note 261, at 508 & n.2 (describing income effect on willingness to pay estimates). But see id.
at 516 (noting that the magnitude of the disparity between willingness to pay and willingness to
sell cannot be entirely explained by the income effect).
357. For example, a person who is desperate for money may be willing to sell resources at a
lower price than if that same person had ample resources to support himself.
358. See, e.g., Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal Hearings, supra note 49, at 357 (statement of Fred Walgenbach) (declaring that "wildlife resources, like our highways, schools, national
defense and national parks, have been relegated to control by state and federal agencies to insure
their availability to all segments of our society and not just to those who would be financially able
to compete if these resources were subject to the market mechanism").
359. See Tribe, supra note 6, at 158-59.
360. Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal Hearings, supra note 49, at 370 (statement of
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Department of the Interior adopts this perspective by using willingness
to sell estimates under its rarely used contingent valuation. 61
For a third reason, willingness to sell measures may better represent the true value that people place on natural resources. Because
of the disparity of results between willingness to pay and willingness to
sell, some commentators assume that the latter measure yields an inaccurately high value. 2 The opposite may be true. 63 Some empirical evidence suggests that willingness to pay studies underestimate value.
Contingent valuation of damages must ask respondents to value resources in terms of dollars. One study, however, asked subjects for their
values both on a dollar scale and on a more abstract rating scale. 64 This
study found that improvements in natural amenities were valued more
highly on the abstract rating scale than on the dollar value scale.3 65 Individuals thus may possess a sense of nature's value that they cannot
express in monetary terms. 6 If this is true, dollar estimates elicited
from contingent valuation underestimate the "felt value" that persons
place on natural resources. Use of the higher willingness to sell responses minimizes this distortion.
Thus, willingness to pay measures derived from contingent valuation underestimate the true damage to natural resources.3 67 Concededly,
Fred Walgenbach). The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association affirmed this conclusion,
explaining:
The willingness-to-pay question assumes that the person does not have the right to the resource, while the willingness-to-sell question assumes that the person does have the right
since it is his option to sell or enjoy the increased service. When the service of a resource is
diminished, asking the user what he should be paid to accept the reduction seems more appropriate. The concept of public good is that the good belongs to no one person but rather the
public at large. As the public's representative, the trustee should be considered the rightful
owner of the resource and be awarded a compensation equivalent to the willingness to sell on
the part of the public.
NOAA REPORT, supra note 80, at 31.
361. 51 Fed. Reg. 27,721 (1986) (stating that the "Department continues to maintain that
willingness to accept may be the criterion most germane to natural resource damages, since the
public has the property right to the injured natural resource").
362. Id.
363. See Bishop & Heberlein, supra note 224, at 929.
364. See Brown, supra note 140, at 242.
365. See id. at 243. The author of the study concluded that "there is a concept of value
regarding environmental amenities which is different from real willingness to pay, which surfaces
in terms of importance and even in willingness-to-pay terms when dollar responses are not used."
Id.
366. See Bishop, Heberlein & Kealy, supra note 248, at 620 (arguing that "[m]ost people
have not previously attempted to express their values for nonmarket goods in monetary terms, and
contingent markets are too artificial to provide a sufficient context for developing accurate
values").
367. See Walsh, Loomis & Gillman, Valuing Option, Existence, and Bequest Demands for
Wilderness, 60 LAND ECON. 14, 19 (1984) (finding that "contingent valuation estimates of willingness to pay underestimate the value of environmental amenities by as much as 60%"). Indeed, one
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willingness to sell estimates may overestimate the true value of damages. Various studies suggest that the true measure of natural resource
value probably lies somewhere between willingness to pay and willingness to sell.36s Willingness to sell might be best used as an upper limit
on true damages.36 9 Use of an upper limit is helpful for determining
whether restoration costs are grossly disproportionate to actual monetary value of damages.
Use of an upper and not a lower limit is especially critical given the
risk of underestimating damages. Uncertainty about nature and its homeostasis provides yet a fourth reason for preferring willingness to sell.
While the relatively high estimates yielded by a willingness to sell measure may result in an overestimate of "true" natural resource damages,
reliance on willingness to pay measures is more likely to underestimate
those damages. Not only is willingness to sell arguably more accurate, it
is less risky. We know far less about the operation of the ecosystem
than we need to reduce risk. "This tendency to act on the knowns and
ignore the unknowns exposes us to extraordinary biological risks. 3 70 In
the face of this uncertainty, it is safest to err in the direction of environmental protection.37 1 Better that too many sites be restored than too
few. This perspective is also consistent with congressional concern for
preservation.
Contingent valuation measures of willingness to sell provide the
best test for the reasonableness of restoration cost. Restoration cost
should be the standard for natural resource damages unless that cost
significantly exceeds a reliable willingness to sell valuation. Given the
relatively minimalist restoration proposed by this Article, exceeding the
limit should seldom happen. The proposal falls short of a complete precontingent valuation study obtained lower willingness to pay estimates than for hedonic price estimation. Id. This finding is unexpected because the latter measure may not include existence value,
and because the study suggests that willingness to pay may underestimate the true value of natural
resources.
368. See Bishop & Heberlein, supra note 224, at 929 (noting that "[o]ur results suggest that
both measures are biased, but in opposite directions"); Bishop, Heberlein & Kealy, supra note 248,
at 620 (declaring that contingent value "mechanisms tend to underestimate willingness-to-pay and
overvalue environmental assets when the criterion is willingness-to-accept-compensation"); Brookshire, Randall & Stoll, Valuing Increments & Decrements and NaturalResource Service Flows, 62
Am J. AGR. EcoN. 478, 482 (1980) (stating a general rule that willingness to pay will be less than
actual consumer surplus, which will be exceeded by willingness to accept).
369. Bishop & Heberlein, supra note 224, at 929.
370. S. EDMuNDs & J. LATRY, ENVIRONMENTAL ADMINISTRATION 295 (1973).
371. See Walsh, Loomis & Gillman, supra note 367, at 19 (stating that because "economic
analysis is unable to place a dollar value on unknown ecological effects" it is wise to employ "a
conservative estimate of the total value to society of protecting these fragile natural environments"); cf. Industrial Union Dep't AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 656
(1980) (authorizing OSHA "to use conservative assumptions in interpreting the data with respect
to carcinogens, risking error on the side of overprotection rather than underprotection").
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scription for natural resource damages, and other serious questions,
such as specific methods of contingent valuation and proper discount
rate, remain to be answered. The proposal is a significant departure
from Department of the Interior regulations, however, and provides the
essential framework for comprehensive natural resource damage
valuation.
VI.

CONCLUSION-PRIVATIZING THE ENVIRONMENT FOR ITS PROTECTION

Establishing accurate means for valuing natural resources transcends Superfund itself. The award of natural resource damages can
provide an essential, uniquely effective tool for the protection of the
natural environment. Broadly used, the right to recover natural resource damages can force the internalization of many pollution costs
and thus create a powerful deterrent to future environmental harm.
To date, government ownership, regulation, and prohibition of activities to protect our nation's natural resources has been the source of
efforts to protect those resources. While government action has
achieved some success, the mechanism has inherent limitations and
may always trail behind the creative force of the free market and the
harm that it may cause. The job of protecting natural resources relegates to government functions that are too large, complex, or widely
dispersed for government to perform.3 2 Instilling private marketplace
decisions with a concern for harm to nature is a vital and necessary
complement to governmental intervention in the market.7
This conclusion is consistent with the growing school of economic
thought that emphasizes the unavoidable imperfections of government
decisionmaking ' 4 Because of these imperfections, institutions and the
electorate tend to support policies that price public products below
marginal cost. 1 5 To remedy these imperfections, government should
372. A. LEOPOLD, supra note 9, at 230.
373. See id. Leopold suggests that the "only visible remedy" is for private owners to recognize an ethical obligation to the land. Given the uncertainty of the development of this ethic, use
of economic incentives represents a next best remedy. Id.
374. See Randall, Methodology, Ideology, and the Economics of Policy: Why Resource
Economists Disagree, 67 AM. J. AGRic. EcoN. 1022, 1023 (1985) (describing the growing economic
literature of public decisionmaking by "imperfect government institutions" as the "mainstream" of
thought); see also C. SCHULTzE, THE PU3LIC USE OF THE PIVATE INTEREST 4 (1977). Schultze
asserts:
There is a growing body of objective evidence that government is not performing its new
tasks effectively. The counterproductivity of governmental regulation of transportation is well
documented. Efforts to improve the environment, while far from a failure, are unnecessarily
expensive and increasingly bogged down in Rube Goldberg regulations, legal snarls, and
games between regulators and industry as enforcement deadlines draw near.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
375. Mumy & Hanke, Public Investment Criteriafor Underpriced Public Products, 65 A.
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create institutions that encourage people in the private and public sectors to behave efficiently. 7 6 Granting recovery for natural resource
damages creates just such an incentive for nondamaging behavior.
The present problem of natural resource destruction derives from
the status of public lands as a common good in a capitalist system, as
recognized in Garrett Hardin's classic article, The Tragedy of the Commons.377 As Hardin observed, "Freedom in a commons brings ruin to
all. '37 s Hardin further projects that "we must soon cease to treat the
parks as commons or they will be of no value to anyone." 7 Nor can the
answer be found in a new naturalist ethic.38 0 Rather, social arrangements that make individuals and business financially responsible must
be established."'
Providing a private remedy for natural resource damages is one
such social arrangement that creates an economic disincentive to harm
resources.382 This economic disincentive should deter harm to natural
resources.3 8 3 Private recovery of cleanup costs under Superfund already
38e
has begun to spur voluntary efforts to clean up hazardous waste sites.
The threat of recovery may prevent the hazardous releases before resources are harmed. One commentator suggests that Superfund's cause
ECON. REv. 712, 719 (1975).
376. Randall, supra note 374, at 1026.
377. 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1969).
378. Id. at 1244. Hardin elaborates:
The rational man finds that his share of the cost of the wastes he discharges into the commons is less than the cost of purifying his wastes before releasing them. Since this is true for
everyone, we are locked into a system of "fouling our own nest," so long as we behave only as
independent, rational, free-enterprisers.
Id. at 1245.
379. Id.
380. See id. at 1246 (arguing that "[ult is a mistake to think that we can control the breeding
of mankind in the long run by an appeal to conscience"). As Hardin notes, even if a majority of
members of society subscribe to and abide by this new ethic, the minority will continue to do
increasing damage and will actually benefit at the expense of the majority. Id.
381. Id. at 1247.
382. See C. SCHULTZE, supra note 374, at 27 (arguing that "the historically demonstrated
power of market-like incentives to influence the pace and direction of technological change warrants every effort to install such incentives in our programs of social intervention"); Dower &
Atkeson, supra note 298, at 43 (declaring that "[e]xperience in other environmental areas has
shown that creativity in shaping institutional arrangements, as was the case in the environmental
impact statement process, can be just as important as substantive provisions of law in achieving
protection of the environment").
383. Commentators frequently assume that new standards of tort liability will deter private
behavior. Some empirical evidence confirms this intuitive assumption. See, e.g., W. HiRSCH, LAW
AND ECONOMICS 170 (1979) (reporting a study of industrial accident rates and finding that establishment of strict liability reduced worker deaths and that government regulation had little or no
impact).
384. See Cross, The Dimensions of a PrivateRight of Action Under Superfund, 19 CONN. L.
REV. 193, 203-04 (1987).
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of action for natural resource damages "created an opportunity for mobilizing unprecedented protection for natural resources across the
3 5
country." 8
To be truly effective, however, recovery must capture the full value
of the harm done to resources. 86 At present, natural resource valuation
under the Department of the Interior guidelines seriously understates
the true social harm from damage to natural resources. As long as this
is the case, natural resources will be destroyed needlessly and at a level
that is economically inefficient. New valuation procedures proposed by
this Article can better capture the full range of natural resource value
8 7
and thereby better protect the environment.

385. Dower & Atkeson, supra note 298, at 43.
386. C. SCHULTZE, supra note 374, at 81 (stating that "[tihe trick is to make sure that the
costs and gains [private actors] confront also reflect, as far as possible true social costs and gains"
(emphasis in original)).
387. See IL ROLSTON, supra note 52, at 193. Rolston observes:
Some dollar values are better than none at all, for otherwise these intangible values get lost in
the middle of pressures for economic use. Especially as the technique [of economic valuation]
has been lately refined, the results significantly aid wilderness preservation. Environmentalists can fight fire with fire and prevent the burning of their wildlands on the altar of progress.
Id. Nevertheless, Rolston is leery of reliance on economic valuation for fear that society may become "disinclined. . . to look for truth in likelier directions." Id. Yet, as a leading environmental
lawyer has pointed out, "It should be possible, in any event, to use market incentives to achieve
environmental goals without compromising these goals or denying their ethical, cultural, and political bases." Sagoff, supra note 133, at 322.

